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ABSTRACT
Two Essays in Asset-Pricing. (August 2011)
Alexey Petkevich, B.A., Belarusian State University; M.S., Texas A&M University
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Arvind Mahajan
Dr. Sorin Sorescu
Past research documents a positive link between momentum and firm-level default
risk, yet this anomaly is not connected to default risk at the macro level. Namely,
there is no documented momentum during recessions, when default is higher on av-
erage. In the first essay, “Momentum and Aggregate Default Risk,” we attempt to
resolve this puzzle by analyzing momentum profits over time, conditional on both
business cycles and unexpected changes in aggregate default risk. First, we show that
momentum is driven by shocks to aggregate default, rather than general economic
conditions such as expansions and recessions. Using the Fama and MacBeth proce-
dure, we find that a conditional default shock factor is priced and can explain a large
portion of the total momentum returns. Second, we provide a risk-based explana-
tion for this anomaly by linking the returns of momentum portfolios to shareholder
recovery during financial distress. We find that losers have higher recovery (i.e.,
shareholders have high bargaining power) on average, and, as a result, have rela-
tively lower risk in high default states of the world. Therefore, loser stocks have a
lower risk premium and lower expected returns in worsening aggregate default con-
ditions, leading to the observed momentum. This effect is more pronounced among
stocks of firms with low credit ratings. Our results help to reconcile the seemingly
contradictory evidence documented by previous studies and offer a rational explana-
tion for the momentum anomaly.
In the second essay, “Sources of Momentum in Bonds,” we study the relationship
between momentum in bond returns and aggregate default. We document that
iv
momentum in corporate bonds occurs mainly during periods of high default shocks
and is driven by losers. Supporting this result, we find that conditional default risk is
priced in the cross-section of corporate bond portfolios. Motivated by these findings,
we develop a theoretical model connecting bond momentum returns to the ability
of bondholders to recover value in financial distress. Specifically, we find that losers
have relatively higher recovery potential and, therefore, become less risky when high
default shocks occur. Thus, losers have lower expected returns in high default shocks,
leading to the observed conditional momentum. Further, US government bonds, with
default risk approaching zero, feature no momentum, however this anomaly prevails
in sovereign bonds with positive default risk, consistent with our main results.
vTo Maryna
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11. INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation we examine the momentum anomaly in the equity and bond
markets. In the first essay, “Momentum and Aggregate Default Risk,” we link mo-
mentum to aggregate default. Past research documents a positive link between mo-
mentum and firm-level default, yet momentum is not connected to default at the
macro-level. There is no documented momentum during recessions, when the firm-
level default is higher on average. We attempt to resolve this puzzle by examining
momentum profits over time, conditional on both business cycles and unexpected
changes in aggregate default risk. First, we document that momentum is driven by
shocks to aggregate default, rather than general economic states such as expansions
and recessions. According to our results a conditional default shock factor is priced
and can explain a large portion of the total momentum returns. In particular, we
show that momentum produces 1.93% per month during high default shocks and
-0.64% per month during low default shocks. Using the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
procedure, we find that the conditional default factor is priced can explain 89% of
this difference. Moreover, our tests indicate that the conditional default premium
remains significant after controlling for exposure to other asset-pricing factors such
as size, value and industrial production growth. Second, we provide a risk-based ex-
planation for momentum by linking the returns on momentum portfolios to potential
shareholder recovery during financial distress. We find that the shareholders of firms
categorized as losers have higher bargaining power on average, and, as a result, have
relatively lower risk in high default states of the world. Therefore, losers have a lower
risk premium and expected returns in worsening aggregate default conditions, lead-
ing to observed momentum returns. This effect is more pronounced among stocks
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Finance.
2of firms with low credit ratings. Moreover, we provide evidence consistent with re-
versal: we show that the conditional default loadings between winners and losers
converge one year after portfolio formation, potentially explaining the observed re-
versal effect. Finally, we document that the shareholder recovery of winners (losers)
increases (decreases) after portfolio formation yielding a relatively lower (higher)
risk and, therefore, lower (higher) expected returns. Our results help to reconcile
the seemingly contradictory evidence documented by previous studies and offer a
rational explanation for the momentum anomaly.
In the second essay, “Sources of Momentum in Bonds,” we ask whether momen-
tum exists in the corporate bond market and attempt to identify major determinants
of this anomaly. We document that momentum in corporate bonds occurs mainly
during periods of high default shocks and is driven by losers. We then document
that conditional default risk is priced in the cross-section of corporate bond portfo-
lios. Motivated by these findings, we develop a theoretical model connecting bond
momentum returns to the ability of bondholders to recover value in financial dis-
tress. Specifically, we find that losers have relatively higher recovery potential and,
therefore, become less risky when high default shocks occur. Thus, losers have lower
expected returns during high default shocks, leading to the observed conditional mo-
mentum. Further, US government bonds, with default risk approaching zero, feature
no momentum; however, this anomaly prevails in sovereign bonds with positive de-
fault risk, consistent with our main results. Finally, we present evidence suggesting
that reversal also exists in bonds and it takes approximately 20 months to offset
cumulative momentum profits.
Overall, we document that momentum in both equity and bond markets is driven
by aggregate default shocks. According to our results, macro-level default is also
priced in both markets and can explain a large portion of momentum profits. Fi-
nally, we document that shareholder (bondholder) recovery can affect equity (bonds)
returns.
32. MOMENTUM AND AGGREGATE DEFAULT RISK
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) find that the momentum strat-
egy is profitable only among stocks with high probability of financial distress. This
suggests that momentum profits should be higher during recessions when default
risk is expected to be high. However, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document
that momentum profits are mainly concentrated in periods of economic expansions.
In this paper, we attempt to resolve this seeming disagreement between the cross-
sectional and time-series findings on momentum profitability. Specifically, we show
that in the time-series, momentum profits are mainly observed in periods of high
shocks to aggregate default, even after controlling for the general state of the econ-
omy. Further, we show that high momentum profits during periods of high default
shocks are driven by the low expected returns of losers. Losers are stocks with high
shareholder recovery potential in default situations, and therefore, they have lower
risk and lower expected returns than winners.
After confirming Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) result that momentum is more
pronounced during periods of expansion rather than recession, we document that
the returns to momentum are concentrated in periods of high default shocks, both
during expansions and recessions. A trading strategy based on buying recent winners
and selling recent losers produces 1.93% per month during high default shocks and
-0.64% per month during low default shocks. Results from a double sort on business
cycles and shocks to aggregate default show that momentum profits are nonexistent
or negative during periods of low default shocks, and are positive during periods of
high default shocks, irrespective of the economic state. This suggests that momentum
is not driven by the general state of the economy, but instead by the state of aggregate
default.
Motivated by the above finding, we construct a conditional default shock factor
and examine its pricing in the cross-section of momentum portfolios. The conditional
4default shock factor takes the value of the default factor during periods of high default
shocks, and zero otherwise. In particular, it is designed to capture the additional
impact of default on returns during periods of increasing aggregate default. Our asset
pricing tests show that the premium on the conditional default factor is negative and
significant, controlling for the market return, HML, SMB, and industrial production
growth. We further document that losers (winners) have positive (negative) exposure
to the conditional default factor. The conditional default premium multiplied by the
difference in exposure to this factor between winners and losers explains up to 89%
the difference between momentum profits in high and low aggregate default states.
Next we examine why the risk exposure of winners to the conditional default fac-
tor differs from that of losers. Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan
(2011) argue that shareholders of certain firms can extract rent using their bargaining
power when the firm cannot meet its financial obligations. Further, shareholders with
a better ability to recover a portion of the residual firm value face relatively lower
risk as the probability of default increases. Similarly, shareholders with a lower or no
ability to recover residual firm value face relatively higher risk when bankruptcy risk
increases. As a result, firms with high shareholder recovery potential should have
lower expected returns than low recovery firms. If the conditional default factor is
a common factor capturing firm-level probability of default, then its loadings should
be high among stocks with high recovery potential and low among low recovery
stocks. If losers in general have high shareholder recovery relative to winners, their
shareholders would face a relatively lower risk as default increases and, thus, would
command relatively lower expected returns during periods of high default shocks.
To examine the efficacy of this argument to explain momentum, we follow Gar-
lappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) by using the firm’s tangi-
bility (receivables, inventory, capital and cash holdings scaled by total book assets),
the Herfindahl index (the concentration of industry sales), and the ratio of R&D
expenditures as proxies for shareholder recovery. Firms with highly tangible assets
5can be more easily liquidated in case of a bankruptcy, while liquidation may lead
to a greater loss in value for firms with more intangible assets. When firms lack
tangible assets to liquidate, it could be more beneficial for creditors to restructure
the debt and other obligations rather than liquidating the firm. Therefore, firms
with mainly intangible assets are less likely to be liquidated, giving shareholders a
strong bargaining position and allowing them to extract more value in distress nego-
tiations due to the decreased chance of outright liquidation. The firm’s Herfindahl
index provides a measure of the specificity of the firm’s assets, which will impact the
market for the firm’s assets. Because firms with highly specific assets may also face
higher liquidation costs in default, such firms are relatively more valuable as going
concerns, giving shareholders higher bargaining power. Finally, we use the ratio of
R&D expenditures to total book assets as a proxy for bargaining power. Again, high
R&D firms are more difficult to liquidate due to high potential growth options and
product specialization. In each case, shareholders with relatively higher bargaining
power or recovery potential will have greater ability to avoid liquidation and recover
value in financial distress. Therefore, an increase in aggregate default should lead
to lower risk and expected equity returns for firms with high shareholder recovery
potential. Note that commonly accepted measures of firm-level default do not take
into account the potential effect of shareholder bargaining power. Between two firms
with the same credit rating, the one with higher bargaining power is less likely to be
liquidated, ceteris paribus. Given the accepted terminology, we have to emphasize
the difference between default and liquidation. The second term is more general and
should include the bargaining potential of the firm’s shareholders.
Using these three measures, we show that losers have lower tangibility and there-
fore, they are stocks with high shareholder bargaining power. Thus, losers should
have relatively lower expected returns during periods of high aggregate default shocks.
As noted earlier, the low expected return of losers in times of high default drives the
profitability of the momentum strategy during these periods. Moreover, we pro-
6vide evidence suggesting that the shareholder recovery of winners (losers) increases
(decreases) after portfolio formation yielding a relatively lower (higher) risk and,
therefore, lower (higher) expected returns. Similarly, the spread in conditional de-
fault loadings between winners and losers disappears approximately one year after
portfolio formation. These results are in-line with the findings of Jegadeesh and Tit-
man (2001) that winners only temporarily outperform losers. Further, we uncover
the driving forces behind the dynamics of shareholder recovery. According to our re-
sults, shareholder bargaining power is driven mostly by the cash holding of the firm.
One of the possible explanations of this finding is that poor market performance of
losers affects their ability to raise cash. Since the poor performance of loser before
portfolio formation might affect their ability to raise cash, losers are stocks with low
tangibility at portfolio formation.
Finally, we analyze the subsample of firms with S&P debt ratings, following
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011), and confirm that momentum does
not exist among high investment grade firms. It is primarily concentrated in the
speculative grade group, but only during periods of high aggregate default shocks
(4.33% per month). Consistent with our overall results, momentum within this subset
is driven by shocks to aggregate default. The momentum strategy during periods of
low default shocks is not profitable and this result holds for all firms.
Ever since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented the momentum effect,1 the
most widely considered explanation for momentum profits has been behavioral over-
reaction or underreaction to firm-specific information.2 Several papers look for risk-
1Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Lewellen (2002) show that momentum exists in industry, size
and book-to-market portfolios, respectively. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document that momen-
tum persists in the period after 1993. Rouwenhorst (1998) documents momentum internationally.
2Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong
and Stein (1999) analyze the overreaction or underreaction explanation for momentum in the con-
text of different psychological biases such as conservatism, self-attributive overconfidence, and slow
information diffusion.
7based evidence to explain momentum profits but are unable to document convincing
results.3 Some papers document significant relation between risk and momentum.4
These risk-based studies focus primarily on one aspect of the momentum anomaly,
i.e., the difference in unconditional expected returns between winners and losers.
However, a more convincing explanation for the existence of momentum profits has to
incorporate other aspects of this anomaly, which have been previously documented.
We extend this literature by examining one additional aspect of momentum related
to its time-series behavior. Our study suggests that the expected returns of winners
and losers change over time because of changing default conditions.
We contribute to the momentum literature on two dimensions. Avramov, Chor-
dia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) establish a link between credit risk and momentum
at the firm level. First, we extend this analysis to the macro level by documenting
that momentum returns are related to aggregate economy-wide default risk. Using
historical information for the estimation of unexpected shocks to default, we fur-
ther show that momentum profits are mainly concentrated during periods of positive
shocks to aggregate default. To our knowledge, aggregate default shocks have not
been studied before in the context of the momentum anomaly. Second, at the firm
level, we link momentum to firm fundamentals related to shareholder bargaining
power during financial distress. In doing so, we provide a rational explanation of
3Fama and French (1996) show that their three-factor model cannot explain momentum. Grundy
and Martin (2001) and Avramov and Chordia (2006) find that controlling for time-varying exposures
to common risk factors does not affect momentum profits. Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) show that
the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) model does not explain momentum either.
4Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) document that liquidity risk accounts for half of momentum profits.
Sadka (2006) finds that shocks to variable component of liquidity are priced in the cross-section of
momentum portfolios. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) show a relation between consumption
risk and momentum portfolios. Ahn, Conrad, and Dittmar (2003) show that a nonparametric risk
adjustment can account for roughly half of momentum profits. Liu and Zhang (2008) show that
winners have higher loadings than losers on the growth rate of industrial production. Chen and
Zhang (2009) document that winner-minus-loser portfolios have positive exposures to a low-minus-
high investment factor.
8the momentum anomaly based on shareholder recovery and time-varying exposure
to aggregate default risk. Overall, we provide further evidence that the existence
of momentum is consistent with a risk-based explanation. Our results suggest that
a large portion of momentum profits can be explained by exposure to conditional
default.
2.1 Momentum and Aggregate Default Shocks
2.1.1 Data and Portfolio Construction
We obtain stock returns, number of shares outstanding, and prices from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly file. The sample is comprised
of all stocks traded on AMEX/NYSE/NASDAQ from January 1960 to December
2009. We exclude stocks that are priced below $1, foreign stocks, and American
Depositary Receipts (ADR).
We follow the methodology introduced by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and
sort stocks into deciles based on their cumulative performance over months t − 6
through t− 1. We skip a month after the formation period since it is not uncommon
to observe a short-term return reversal. The momentum portfolios are formed by
equally weighting firms in each of the deciles. The top decile represents winners and
the bottom decile consists of losers. We form momentum portfolios every month and
hold them for the next six months (referred to as the 6-1-6 strategy).
Table 2.1 presents the average monthly returns and other descriptive statistics
for equally-weighted momentum portfolios over the period January 1960 to Decem-
ber 2009. Portfolio 1 and portfolio 10 are comprised of loser and winner stocks,
respectively. Basic descriptive statistics, such as median, standard deviation, and
percentiles are presented in the corresponding columns.
Table 2.1 shows that winners outperform losers by 0.79% per month which is
consistent with previous studies. The distribution of losers tends to be flatter than
9Table 2.1
Summary Statistics of Equity Momentum.
This table presents descriptive statistics for monthly returns of equally-weighted momentum portfolios over the period
1960 - 2009. The momentum portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 strategy. W and L are comprised of winners and
losers, respectively. The momentum strategy is represented by portfolio W-L.
Portfolios Mean Std. 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
L 0.95% 9.65% -13.10% -4.02% 0.63% 4.83% 16.39%
2 0.91% 7.13% -9.84% -2.87% 0.83% 4.37% 11.38%
3 1.01% 6.03% -8.86% -2.23% 1.04% 3.95% 10.09%
4 1.11% 5.38% -7.74% -1.62% 1.39% 3.77% 9.33%
5 1.16% 4.99% -7.04% -1.36% 1.40% 3.65% 8.52%
6 1.21% 4.77% -6.54% -1.29% 1.51% 3.66% 8.27%
7 1.27% 4.77% -6.46% -1.26% 1.67% 4.01% 8.15%
8 1.35% 4.97% -6.72% -1.27% 1.76% 4.41% 8.37%
9 1.47% 5.51% -7.59% -1.36% 1.79% 4.93% 9.24%
W 1.74% 6.81% -9.66% -2.12% 2.15% 5.84% 11.25%
W - L 0.79% 6.35% -9.02% -0.98% 1.29% 3.36% 8.32%
10
that of winners. The standard deviation of winners is 6.81%, while the volatility
of losers is 9.65%. The fact that losers are more volatile than winners makes their
performance differential even more puzzling.
2.1.2 Sorting on Business Cycles and Default Shocks
Previous empirical studies suggest that the momentum anomaly is primarily con-
centrated in periods of economic expansions. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) find
that momentum is correlated with variables related to the business cycle and it is
mainly observed during expansions. Further, Stivers and Sun (2010) provide evidence
suggesting that the momentum anomaly is a pro-cyclic phenomenon. In particular,
they argue that an increase (decrease) in cross-sectional dispersion in recent stock
returns, which is likely to be associated with bad (good) times, causes the subsequent
momentum profits to decline (increase). Hence, they conclude that the momentum
premium is higher in good times.
We begin the analysis by examining whether previously documented results hold
in our sample. Specifically, we calculate the return of the momentum strategy that
buys winners and shorts losers during expansions and recessions.5 The results of
this sorting procedure are presented in Panel A of Table 2.2. Winners significantly
outperform losers during expansions. The return to the momentum strategy during
these periods is 0.85% per month and statistically different from zero. On the other
hand, momentum profits during periods of contraction are essentially zero (0.18%
with a t-statistics of 0.44).
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) show that the profitability of
momentum is driven by companies with high credit risk (low credit ratings). Since
5Expansions and recessions and are defined according to National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) recession dates.
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Table 2.2
Momentum Portfolio Returns Conditional on Business Cycles and Default Shocks.
This table documents returns on portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure conditional on business cycles and
aggregate default shocks over the period 1960 - 2009. The returns associated with the momentum strategy (6-1-6)
based on equally-weighted portfolios are presented in the columns with t-statistics in parentheses. W and L represent
portfolios comprised of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The
sample period is from 1960 to 2009. Panel A presents sorts based on expansions and recessions, Panel B contains
results from sorts based on periods of high and low default shocks, and Panel C incorporates sorts based on both
business cycles and default shocks.
W L W - L
Panel A. State of the business cycle
Expansions 2.05% 1.20% 0.85%
( 7.00) ( 3.34) ( 2.83)
Recessions -0.43% -0.61% 0.18%
( -0.52) (-0.44) (0.44)
Panel B. Default shocks
Low Default 2.75% 3.40% -0.64%
(7.58) (5.65) (-1.55)
High Default 0.62% -1.32% 1.93%
(1.79) (-2.80) (7.35)
Panel C. Default shocks and business cycles
Expansions Low Default 2.81% 3.09% -0.28%
( 7.30) ( 5.10) ( -0.63)
Expansions High Default 1.28% -0.45% 1.74%
( 2.97) (-0.97) (6.34)
Recessions Low Default 2.39% 6.14% -3.75%
( 2.18) ( 2.52) ( -2.14)
Recessions High Default -2.28% -5.04% 2.76%
( -2.10) (-3.64) (3.74)
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credit risk is likely to be important during recessions, the previous finding that
momentum is profitable in expansions presents a puzzle. In this section we attempt
to explain this apparent inconsistency. Instead of focusing on the general state of
the business cycle, we examine aggregate default shocks. Since momentum is driven
by high credit risk firms (likely to have a higher probability of default), it is natural
to examine the time series relation between momentum profits and aggregate default
risk.
We measure the aggregate default premium as the yield spread between Moody’s
CCC corporate bond index and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond. To capture unex-
pected changes in aggregate default, we derive innovations in the default premium
as the residual from the following model:
DEFt = α0 + α1DEFt−1 + α2DEFt−2 + ξt, (2.1)
where, DEFt is default spread in month t, and unexpected shocks to default are
represented by ξt. The values of residuals above (below) median correspond to posi-
tive (negative) shocks in aggregate default. To avoid a look-ahead bias, we estimate
equation (2.1) using information up to time t − 1.6 First, we estimate model 2.1
using the pre-sample period (from January of 1954 to December of 1959). Then we
add one observation to the sample and estimate the model to obtain the value of the
residual in January of 1960. We continue this procedure until residuals are estimated
for every observation of the time-series. By implementing this approach the residuals
at time t are conditional on information known from January 1954 to t− 1.
We argue that using shocks rather than levels of the default spread is more suit-
able for capturing unexpected changes in aggregate default conditions. Figure 2.1
shows the time-series of default shocks and levels. Shaded areas of the graph corre-
6Using unadjusted shocks yields similar results.
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spond to periods of recessions as defined by NBER. This figure documents that the
default spread and recessions are fairly correlated (the correlation is approximately
30%), however, default shocks do not appear to follow the same pattern (the cor-
relation is only 5%). This suggests that default shocks potentially capture default
conditions that are less related to general economic states such as recessions and
expansions. For example, during the expansion in October of 1996 the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) reported that their loan default rate was greater
than the overall national default rate. The following reform forced SBA to repur-
chase millions of dollars worth of credit, even though, about 50% of defaulted loans
were never recovered. These events affected investors’ perception of default risk and
led to an increase in the default spread by almost 3%. However, they did not affect
the economy in the long-term and, therefore, these events cannot be captured by the
recession dummy.
We use aggregate default shocks to split the sample in two states of nature: high
default shock periods and low default shock periods. According to our results default
shocks are evenly split and recessions take approximately 20% of the total sample.
We then estimate momentum profits for each state of aggregate default. The results
presented in Panel B of Table 2.2 suggest that momentum is highly correlated with
shocks to aggregate default. The return to the momentum strategy is on average
1.93% per month during high default periods, with a t-statistics of 7.35. On the other
hand, momentum returns are close to zero during periods of low default shocks.
Since the correlation between the NBER recession dummy and shocks to aggre-
gate default is not perfect (it is only 5% in our sample), the relation between mo-
mentum profitability and aggregate default that we document does not contradict
previous findings. We use independent sorts to separate the sample into recessions
and expansions and positive and negative shocks to aggregate default. The results of
this procedure are presented in Panel C of Table 2.2. Clearly, default shocks occur
during expansions as well as during contractions. Panel C of Table 2.2 documents
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Fig. 2.1. Default Spread and Default Shocks.
This figure shows the time-series of default shocks as defined by residuals of (2.1) and the yield spread between
Moody’s CCC corporate bond index and the 10-year Treasury bond. Shaded areas of the graph correspond to
periods of recessions as defined by NBER.
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that momentum profitability is concentrated during periods of high default shocks
irrespective of the state of the business cycle. The average return to the momentum
strategy during high default shocks is 1.74% per month in expansions and 2.76% in
recessions. Both of them are statistically significant. In contrast, there is virtually no
momentum when aggregate default decreases in good times and there is negative mo-
mentum when aggregate default decreases in bad times (-3.75% per month). These
results reveal that poor momentum performance during recessions (documented in
Panel A, as well as by previous research) can be explained by the fact that positive
momentum in high default states (2.76%) is offset by negative momentum returns
during low default states (-3.76%).
In summary, the results thus far indicate that momentum profits are pronounced
in periods of high default shocks. Without conditioning on aggregate default shocks,
it is possible to erroneously conclude that momentum is primarily concentrated in
periods of economic expansions. However, conditioning on aggregate default shocks,
we find that momentum profitability is related to states of high default. This result
is new to the best of our knowledge and has important implications for explaining the
momentum anomaly. It is in line with the observation that momentum profitability
is concentrated among stocks that are likely to be more sensitive to aggregate default
conditions (stocks of low credit rating firms). Moreover, the relation between mo-
mentum and positive shocks to aggregate default that we uncover reveals important
time series properties of momentum returns.
In the next section we examine whether aggregate default has the ability to
explain the cross-sectional behavior of momentum portfolios. In other words, we
want to answer the question: do winners and losers have different exposures to high
unexpected default states and furthermore, are high shocks to default priced in the
cross-section of momentum portfolios?
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2.1.3 Conditional Default Shocks
We start with a general asset-pricing model of the form:
E[ri] = γ0 + β
′
1γi, (2.2)
where, E[ri] represents the expected excess return on asset i, γi is a vector of factor
prices of risk, β′1 is a vector of factor loadings, and γ0 is a constant. For parsimony, we
initially consider two risk factors: the market return and unexpected default shocks.
Since our empirical results imply that the relation between momentum and unex-
pected default depends on the nature of the default shock, we further model aggregate
default as a scaled factor. We scale only the default factor and, therefore, allow the
default betas of different assets to vary across the two different default states, i.e.,
(high (positive) default shocks and low (negative) default shocks). Specifically, we
introduce a conditional default factor:7
Cξt = Itξt, (2.3)
where ξt denotes a non-traded default factor measured by default shock at time t (the
residual from (2.1), and It is an indicator function that equals 1 if the economy is in
a period of high default shock and 0 otherwise.8 Therefore, the conditional default
variable takes a non-zero value only during periods of positive default shocks.
The return-generating process can be written as:
Rei,t = βi + β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt + β
DEF
i ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + i,t, (2.4)
7Watanabe and Watanabe (2011) apply a similar approach for the analysis of time-varying liquidity.
8The indicator function is estimated using the cumulative recursive procedure explained in section
2.1.2
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where, MKTRFt is the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio. Given
the previous evidence that momentum profits only occur during states of high un-
expected default, we are particularly interested in the βCDEFi coefficients of winners
and losers. The βCDEFi coefficient measures the beta spread for each asset between
the two states of aggregate default. Therefore, the default beta of an asset during
low default shock periods is βDEFi , and its default beta during high default shock
periods is (βDEFi + β
CDEF
i ).
We follow the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-pass procedure to estimate the
factor risk premia in equation (2.4). We use the full sample from 1960 to 2009 in the
first-pass beta estimation. We do not use a rolling beta approach since the default
beta is already state-dependent. Since the betas are generated regressors, we use a
standard error correction proposed by Shanken (1992) to account for the errors-in-
variables problem in the second stage of Fama-MacBeth. In order to estimate the
factor risk premia in equation (2.4), we use 30 test assets. These assets include 10
momentum portfolios, 10 size portfolios, and 10 book-to-market portfolios.9
Table 2.3 presents the loadings of the momentum portfolios with respect to
the market return (βMKTRF ), unexpected default (βDEF ), and conditional default
(βCDEF ). According to the results presented in the table, the loser portfolio has a
negative loading on default (-3.83) and a positive conditional default loading (2.70).
Therefore, the loser portfolio loading in high default states is -1.13. The winner port-
folio has a loading of -0.09 on default and a loading of -0.47 on conditional default.
Therefore, the winner portfolio loading in high default states is -0.56. The spread
between the winners’ and losers’ loadings on conditional default is significant with a
t-statistic of -2.38.
910 size and 10 book-to-market portfolios are obtained from Kenneth R. French’s web site. Liu and
Zhang (2008) also uses 10 size, 10 book-to-market, and 10 momentum portfolios for momentum
analysis. Adding 10 industry portfolios to the sample will yield similar results.
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Table 2.3
Aggregate Default Loadings.
This table presents loadings of each of the 10 momentum portfolios on the market (MKTRF), default (DEF) and
conditional default factors (CDEF measured by the product of DEF and I, where I is an indicator function which
equals to 1 if the economy is in period of high default shock (above median) and 0 otherwise). The equally-weighted
portfolios momentum portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 momentum strategy. W and L represent the portfolios
comprised of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The sample
period is from 1960 to 2009. The loadings are estimated from the following model - Rei,t = βi+β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt+
βDEFi ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + i,t. The loadings on the market β
MKTRF , default shocks βDEF and conditional default
shocks βCDEF are estimated for the returns of each of the 10 momentum portfolios. The t-statistics from the
regressions are based on Huber-White robust standard errors.
Portfolio βMKTRF t-stat βDEF t-stat βCDEF t-stat
L 1.36 19.03 -3.83 -3.14 2.70 1.96
2 1.17 23.94 -2.04 -2.90 1.13 1.41
3 1.06 25.95 -1.30 -2.96 0.59 1.17
4 0.99 27.08 -0.85 -3.07 0.29 0.87
5 0.94 27.81 -0.61 -3.13 0.15 0.60
6 0.91 27.32 -0.46 -3.11 0.08 0.41
7 0.92 27.67 -0.33 -2.59 -0.04 -0.22
8 0.96 28.02 -0.18 -1.38 -0.20 -1.10
9 1.05 29.36 -0.07 -0.46 -0.38 -1.87
W 1.23 28.41 -0.09 -0.38 -0.47 -1.88
W - L -0.13 -1.73 3.75 3.19 -3.18 -2.38
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Untabulated results show that the unconditional default betas of losers and win-
ners are both negative (-2.40 and -0.33, respectively), and the difference is statisti-
cally significant. Therefore, losers (winners) do better (worse) in states of high default
than their unconditional default betas would suggest. This implies that losers might
have a hedging ability during states of high unexpected default, controlling for their
market betas. Table 2.3 reveals the familiar U-shape pattern in the market betas
of momentum portfolios. This pattern suggests that exposure to the market return
alone is not able to capture the momentum anomaly.
The results so far indicate that losers perform better than the CAPM model
(augmented with unconditional default shocks) predicts in periods of high unexpected
default. In contrast, winners perform worse than the CAPM model (augmented with
unconditional default shocks) predicts in high default states. This suggests that losers
might offer lower expected returns than winners in high default states since they offer
insurance against such states. To examine this possibility in more detail, we need to
estimate the price of risk for conditional default.
We estimate factor prices of risk in the second stage of the Fama-MacBeth pro-
cedure using 30 portfolios sorted on momentum, size, and book-to-market. The size
and book-to-market portfolios are necessary to create a larger cross-section of test
assets. Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the prices of risk and their corresponding
t-statistics, adjusted for errors-in-variables. Model 1 corresponds to the CAPM. The
market risk premium is not significant which is consistent with previous empirical
findings. Model 2 augments the CAPM with the unexpected default factor, and the
results reveal that the default factor is not priced. Model 3 is our main specifica-
tion that introduces the conditional default factor CDEF ; it has a negative and
significant premium.
To examine the economic significance of the conditional default premium we
compare the actual difference in momentum profits during high and low default
states to the expected difference. As shown in Table 2.2, the momentum profit in
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Table 2.4
Cross-sectional Analysis of Time-varying Aggregate Default Shocks.
This table presents estimated monthly premiums based on the Fama-MacBeth regressions and using 30 portfolios
sorted on momentum, size and book-to-market. MKTRF is the excess return on the market, DEF is aggregate
default shocks, CDEF is the conditional aggregate default shocks measured by the product of DEF and I, where
I is an indicator function which equals to 1 if the economy is in period of high default shock (above median) and 0
otherwise. T-statistics based on the Shanken (1992) method are reported in parentheses below. The sample period
is from 1960 to 2009.
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3)
MKTRF 0.0010 0.0014 0.0027
(0.24) (0.40) (0.54)
DEF 0.0001 -0.0043
(0.05) (-1.83)
CDEF -0.0072
(-2.70)
CONST 0.0011 0.0051 0.0028
(1.42) (1.80) (0.59)
Adj.R2 0.24 0.39 0.58
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high default states is 1.93% and -0.64% in low default states. The difference between
the two is 2.57%. The expected difference in momentum profits between high and
low default states equals the conditional default premium (-0.0072, Model 3 of Table
2.4) multiplied by the spread in conditional default betas between winners and losers
(-3.18, Table 2.3), i.e., 2.29%. Therefore, conditional default exposure of winners
and losers explains 89% of the difference between momentum profitability in high
and low default states.
Interestingly, the premium on unexpected default in low default states is also
negative and marginally significant. As shown previously, losers have high expected
returns in states of low default shocks. This observation is in line with their loadings
on this factor. In the next section we explore one possible explanation for the hedging
ability of losers in periods of high unexpected default.
2.2 Financial Distress, Shareholder Bargaining Power, and Momentum
We start with the observation that losers perform better than predicted by the
CAPM during high unexpected default shocks. In addition, losers, by definition,
experience a series of price declines before portfolio formation and, therefore, they
are likely to be financially distressed and closer to default. The question is: why do
stocks with a high probability of default do better than expected when the aggregate
risk of defaulting increases? We rely on a model by Garlappi and Yan (2011) to
explore this.
Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that shareholders have an ability to recover a part
of the residual firm value when the firm is on the verge of bankruptcy. However, the
possibility of shareholder recovery varies significantly based on shareholder bargain-
ing power that depends on characteristics of the firms. The authors demonstrate that
the expected equity returns of high bargaining power firms decrease as bankruptcy
risk increases, because the shareholders have a strong bargaining position and, there-
fore, lower risk when the firm is in financial distress. Therefore, if the probability of
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financial distress should increase, the shareholders with high bargaining power will
relatively benefit in this economic environment, because of high recovery possibility.
On the other hand, the shareholders of firms with low recovery potential will have
a weak bargaining position in distress negotiations. Therefore, if the probability of
financial distress increases, the equity of these types of firms will become riskier and
generate higher expected returns.
We hypothesize that losers are high bankruptcy risk and high shareholder recovery
stocks. Then, they possibly have low expected returns in high default states because
their shareholders do not require additional premium for holding equity in high
default states of the world. In the next section we examine whether losers indeed
posses these characteristics.
2.2.1 Firm-level Default Risk
We use two measures to capture financial distress risk at the firm level. The first
proxy is based on an option-pricing measure proposed by Bharath and Shumway
(2008). It is essentially an extension of the Merton (1974) model that incorporates
reasonable assumptions to simplify the estimation process. Bharath and Shumway
(2008) demonstrate that this modified measure of financial distress performs reason-
ably well. One of the advantages of using this approach is that it allows a simplified
methodology that captures the firm-specific probability of bankruptcy. The major
assumptions underlying this measure are that 1) the market value of debt is equal
to its face value, 2) the volatility of debt is a function of stock volatility, and 3) the
expected return is equal to the stock return from the previous period.
Then, if E and F represent the market value of equity and the face value of debt,
respectively, the “naive” distance to default measure can be defined as:
DDnaive =
ln[(E + F )/F ] + (rit−1 − 0.5σ2V )T
σV
√
T
, (2.5)
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where, σV is the standard deviation of the firm’s value and T is the estimation period.
The naive probability of default is
pinaive = N(−DDnaive). (2.6)
The distance to default is based on the assumption that equity is a call option on the
firm value with a strike price equal to the value of the firm’s debt. This procedure
estimates the probability of debt value being higher than the fundamental value of
the firm at time T , or the probability that the “option” is out-of-money (this is why
DDnaive is negative in (3.17)). In other words, this estimates the probability that
the equity “option” on the firm is out-of-the-money, and the equity holders choose
to let the option expire, that is, let the firm default on its obligations.
However, the naive probability of default incorporates the market value of the
firm, which is related to the recent performance of the firm’s equity and, therefore,
momentum returns. To avoid this potential problem, we also introduce another
measure of individual distress based on the modified Altman Z-score. This measure
incorporates financial statements data and is not affected by market value of eq-
uity. We follow Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) and estimate the modified
Altman Z-score as:
Z-score =
1.2×WC + 1.4×RE + 3.3× EBIT + SALES
TA
, (2.7)
where, WC, RE, EBIT , and SALES correspond to working capital, retained earn-
ings, earnings before interest and taxes, and sales, respectively. TA represents book
value of total assets. An increase in the modified Z-score implies a decline in the
firm’s probability of bankruptcy.
We compute each of these two measures of financial distress for losers and winners
portfolios as equally-weighted averages of the individual measures for the stocks in
each portfolio. Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the results. Specifically, we find that
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the probability of default for losers is 18.03% higher than for winners. Moreover, the
modified Z-score of losers (0.61) is lower than that of winners (1.63). The difference
between winners and losers is statistically significant for both measures of financial
distress.
Table 2.5
Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Probability of Financial Dis-
tress of Momentum.
This table reports shareholder bargaining power and financial distress of the portfolios of losers (L) and winners
(W). Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). Panel A shows the average shareholder bargaining
power of winners and losers using the tangibility measure (reflects the expected liquidation value of the firm) and the
Herfindahl index based on sales (represents the specificity of the assets) based a 2-digit SIC code industry, and the
ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Panel B estimates the average probability of financial distress of winners and
losers using a modified Z-score and the probability of default based on the Merton (1974) model. The sample period
is from 1960 to 2009. The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series t-statistics for the average monthly
measures of financial distress and shareholder bargaining power.
W L W - L
Panel A. Financial distress
Z-score 1.63 0.61 1.02
(12.74)
Probability of Default 0.88% 18.91% -18.03%
(-33.12)
Panel B. Shareholder bargaining power
Tangibility 0.58 0.56 0.02
(9.01)
Herfindahl index 9.17% 10.21% -1.04%
(-5.55)
R&D ratio 6.51% 7.87% -1.36%
(-5.67)
In summary, the above evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that losers
are more financially distressed than winners. This is not surprising given that they
have recently experienced a series of price declines. More importantly, observing
that losers have a higher probability of default explains their higher sensitivity to
worsening aggregate default conditions.
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2.2.2 Shareholder Recovery and Bargaining Power
To proxy for shareholder recovery and bargaining power Garlappi, Shu, and Yan
(2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) use measures capturing the costs entailed in
liquidating the firm. The shareholders of firms that are relatively difficult/costly
(easy/less costly) to liquidate will have a stronger (weaker) position in distress nego-
tiations. It is potentially more beneficial for creditors to negotiate with shareholders
to restructure the obligations of the firm that is difficult/costly to liquidate rather
than continue with the actual liquidation. We follow Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008)
and use three measures of shareholder recovery based on expected liquidation value
(tangibility), liquidation costs (Herfindahl index), and R&D expenses to estimate
the shareholder bargaining power in financial distress negotiations.
The first measure of shareholder recovery is based on the tangibility of the firm’s
assets. Firms with high concentration of tangible assets are potentially easier/less
costly to liquidate in case of bankruptcy. Claimants of such a firm in financial
distress have less incentive to negotiate with shareholders and restructure the firm’s
obligations. Therefore, the expected residual recovery and the bargaining power this
firm’s shareholders in distress negotiations will be relatively low.
On the other hand, firms with a high concentration of intangible assets can be
costly to liquidate. Since the expected liquidation value and, therefore, recovery by
creditors of this type of firm will be relatively low, it will make reorganization prefer-
able, giving shareholders higher bargaining power and the possibility to recover some
of the residual value of the firm. Thus, low tangibility is favorable for shareholders
when such a firm gets closer to financial distress.
Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) estimate that one dollar of total book value,
depending upon the type of asset, generates: 71.5 cents for receivables, 54.7 cents
for inventory, and 53.5 cents for property plant and equipment, in case of liquida-
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tion. Following Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), we add cash holdings, and use their
approach to estimate the expected asset liquidation value or tangibility as
Tng =
(0.715×Receivables+ 0.547× Inventory + 0.535× PPE + Cash)
TotalAssets
. (2.8)
Low tangibility implies low expected liquidation value and higher shareholder recov-
ery and bargaining power.
The second proxy of shareholder recovery is based on asset specificity. Firms with
highly specific assets face higher liquidation costs and their creditors are more likely
to choose restructuring the obligations of the firm over liquidation. Hence, high
assets specificity provides the shareholders of the firm with a superior bargaining
position during financial distress negations.
The Herfindahl index serves as a measure of the specificity of the firm’s assets.
If the index is relatively high (low), it indicates that asset specificity is high (low)
and, therefore, it is more (less) costly to liquidate the firm. Hence, the bargaining
power and shareholder recovery increase when the value of the Herfindahl index rises.
To capture asset specificity, we follow Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and use the
Herfindahl index (HI) based on sales and two-digit SIC codes:
HIj,t =
Nj,t∑
i=1
s2i,t, (2.9)
where, si,t represents sales of firm i at time t as a proportion of total sales of its’
industry j. Firms belonging to an industry with a higher Herfindahl index should
have higher asset specificity and, hence, higher shareholder recovery and bargaining
power.
Finally, the last measure of shareholder bargaining power is based on the ratio
of R&D expenses to book total assets. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that R&D
is a good proxy of product specialization. Besides, Opler and Titman (1994) predict
that high R&D firms are more sensitive to financial distress and, therefore, the
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shareholders of these firms should have high bargaining power during periods of high
default shocks.
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the shareholder recovery measures of winners and
losers. The results show that winners tend to have higher tangibility on average.
More importantly, the difference in tangibility between the two groups is statistically
significant (0.02 with a t-statistics of 9.01). Moreover, the specificity of assets as
measured by the Herfindahl index is higher for losers. Finally, we find that losers
have a higher R&D ratio (6.51% vs. 7.87% for winners and losers, respectively)
suggesting that it is more costly to liquidate of these firms. Therefore, shareholders
of losers have higher bargaining power, leading to lower risk and lower expected
returns. Overall, these results suggest that losers are likely to be firms with low
tangibility, high asset specificity, who spend relatively more on R&D, and, therefore,
they are likely to have high shareholder bargaining power.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that losers tend to have high
shareholder bargaining power and also face a higher probability of financial distress
than winners. Therefore, losers do not require additional premium in states of high
unexpected default, because their shareholders have an ability to recover some of the
residual value of the firm. These results provide a plausible explanation for the low
expected returns of losers observed in periods of high aggregate default shocks.
2.3 Analysis by Credit Risk Groups
This section presents further evidence on the relation between momentum and
aggregate default. In Section 2.3.1 we examine the relation between aggregate de-
fault shocks and momentum returns conditional on different credit risk groups. The
purpose of this analysis is to test whether high credit risk stocks, which drive the
momentum anomaly, are also sensitive to aggregate default shocks. Besides, this
test will ascertain the previous findings are not unique to our specific sample and
test-period.
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Section 2.3.2 explores how the conditional default betas of the momentum portfo-
lios change depending on credit risk. We conjecture that financially distressed firms
are sensitive to worsening default conditions and, therefore, the largest difference
between the CDEF loadings of losers and winners should be observed for high credit
risk group. Moreover, if our conjecture is correct, the conditional default factor
should not be priced for low credit risk stocks.
Section 2.3.3 reports the difference in shareholder recovery and probability of
financial distress between winners and losers for each of the credit risk groups. A
central prediction of Garlappi and Yan (2011) is an inverse U-shaped relation between
expected returns and the probability of financial distress for high recovery stocks.
That is, the expected returns of high recovery stocks should decrease in bankruptcy
risk for speculative grade firms (those with low credit rated bonds, or speculative
grade firms). This relation does not necessarily hold for stocks in the low credit risk
group (firms with high credit rated bonds, or investment grade firms). Even though
the investment grade firms have high shareholder recovery, they also have lower
probability of financial distress and, therefore, they are less likely to be affected by
shareholder recovery.
2.3.1 Momentum Profits by Credit Risk Group
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) show that momentum profits
exist only in stocks of low credit rated firms. We extend this study’s cross-sectional
analysis by analyzing how shocks to aggregate default affect returns of different credit
rating groups. According to our proposition, low credit rating stocks are less sensitive
to aggregate default shocks than stocks with high credit ratings. We argue that the
shareholders of speculative grade losers face relatively lower risk as aggregate default
increases (because of a higher recovery potential) and, therefore, they should have
lower expected returns. Investment grade losers are less likely to display the same
behavior, since their initial credit risk is too low to create any recovery concerns. If
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our proposition is correct, momentum profits will be observed mainly in low credit
risk stocks during high default states and driven mostly by losers.
To analyze the momentum anomaly within different credit risk groups separately,
we obtain the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit ratings from the Compustat
Rating database. This database contains detailed information about total credit
risk of the firm, rather than of its individual bonds. Following Avramov, Chordia,
Jostova, and Philipov (2011) we assign numeric equivalents to the ratings. Higher
numbers correspond to lower ratings (for example, 1 represents AAA rating and 22
corresponds to D). We split the sample into three credit risk categories: investment
grade, middle grade, and speculative grade firms, based on the numeric values. The
time period of the sample is from 1986 to 2009.
We estimate the performance of the momentum strategy for each of the three
credit risk groups, conditional on aggregate default shocks. Table 2.6 presents the
results of this analysis. Panel A documents the profitability of the momentum strat-
egy among speculative grade firms. As predicted, momentum profits are generated
during high default periods (4.33% per month with a t-statistics of 6.83). On the
other hand, there is no significant difference between the performance of speculative
grade winners and losers during periods of low default shocks (-1.52% per month
with a t-statistics of -1.25). We emphasize that high credit risk stocks do not always
generate positive momentum profits. One explanation of this result is that these
stocks are less sensitive to default shocks in periods of low default.
Panels B and C of Table 2.6 contain the results for middle and investment grade
firms. Consistent with our predictions, momentum profits become less pronounced
for firms with higher investment grades. Specifically, Panel B documents that the
returns from the momentum strategy using middle grade firms are 1.41% and -0.90%
per month during periods of high and low default shocks, respectively. Finally, in
Panel C we observe that for investment grade stocks there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the returns of losers and winners in high or low default
30
Table 2.6
Momentum Portfolio Returns by Credit Risk Groups.
This table presents returns of momentum portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure using aggregate default
shocks over the period from 1985 to 2009. The returns generated using the momentum strategy (6-1-6) based on
equally-weighted portfolios are presented in three columns. W and L represent the portfolios comprised of winners
and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). Panel A, Panel B and Panel C
contain results obtained from sorting based on speculative grade, middle grade and investment grade firms. The
numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series t-statistics for the average monthly returns.
W L W - L
Panel A. Speculative grade stocks
Low Default 3.27% 4.80% -1.52%
(5.54) (3.42) (-1.25)
High Default 0.60% -3.73% 4.33%
(0.89) (-4.64) (6.83)
Panel B. Middle grade stocks
Low Default 2.27% 3.17% -0.90%
(6.00) (4.21) (-1.39)
High Default 0.70% -0.71% 1.41%
(1.36) (-1.17) (3.82)
Panel C. Investment grade stocks
Low Default 1.82% 2.06% -0.24%
(4.93) (3.15) (-0.42)
High Default 0.91% 0.29% 0.62%
(2.12) (0.60) (1.44)
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shock states. It is interesting that in times of high default, winners generate similar
performance across all three credit risk groups (0.60%, 0.70% and 0.91% for specula-
tive, middle and investment grade stocks, respectively). This result provides further
evidence that losers drive the momentum anomaly.
Controlling for different credit risk groups, the results confirm our previous con-
clusion that momentum is profitable only in states of high default shocks. While
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) show that momentum is driven
by high credit risk stocks, our time-series analysis reveals that this is true only in
periods of high aggregate default shocks. The immediate implication of this result
is that momentum profits can be increased by focusing on speculative grade firms
but only in high default states. This implies that momentum is observed under very
specific circumstances, namely, at the intersection of cross-sectional and time-series
default.
2.3.2 Conditional Default Premium by Credit Risk Groups
This section analyzes the conditional default loadings of portfolios comprised of
stocks from each of the three credit risk groups. We hypothesize that speculative
grade stocks, which have a higher probability of financial distress, are more sensitive
to the conditional default factor than stocks of investment grade firms.
We estimate conditional default loadings of the 10 momentum portfolios in each
credit rating group using (2.4). Table 2.7 reports the results of this analysis. Columns
βCDEFSG , β
CDEF
MG , and β
CDEF
IG correspond to the conditional default loadings of specula-
tive, middle, and investment grade stocks, respectively. The results suggest that the
sensitivity of momentum portfolio returns to the conditional default factor (βCDEF )
is higher for speculative grade firms. In particular, as we move from the speculative
to the investment grade group of firms, the conditional default loadings of losers
decrease from 4.48 to 1.25, and that of winners increase from -0.87 to -0.74.
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Table 2.7
Conditional Default Loadings by Credit Risk Groups.
This table reports loadings for the returns of each of the 10 momentum portfolios on the conditional default factor
(CDEF measured by the product of DEF and I, where I is an indicator function which equals to 1 if the economy
is in period of high default shock (above median) and 0 otherwise) by credit risk groups. The equally-weighted
portfolios momentum portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 momentum strategy. W and L represent the portfolios
comprised of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The sample
period is from 1985 to 2009. The conditional default loading are estimated from the following model - Rei,t =
βi + β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt + β
DEF
i ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + i,t. β
CDEF
SG represent the loadings of the momentum portfolios
based on speculative grade firms, βCDEFMG the loadings based on middle grade and β
CDEF
IG based on investment grade
firms. The t-statistics from the regressions are based on Huber-White robust standard errors.
Portfolio βCDEFSG t-stat β
CDEF
MG t-stat β
CDEF
IG t-stat
L 4.48 4.71 1.50 3.10 1.25 3.18
2 2.64 4.37 0.66 1.98 0.62 2.27
3 2.22 4.46 0.31 1.08 0.37 1.62
4 1.34 2.89 0.33 1.23 0.29 1.40
5 1.12 2.72 0.20 0.83 0.10 0.53
6 0.58 1.64 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.29
7 0.34 1.00 -0.14 -0.63 -0.12 -0.63
8 0.05 0.17 -0.30 -1.37 -0.19 -1.08
9 -0.23 -0.66 -0.48 -2.07 -0.42 -2.32
W -0.87 -2.01 -0.78 -2.80 -0.74 -3.38
W - L -5.36 -4.39 -2.28 -2.13 -1.99 -1.79
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We also estimate the CAPM model augmented with unexpected default and
conditional default variables for each credit risk category. As before, we add 10 size
and 10 book-to-market portfolios to the set of test assets in order to create a larger
cross-section for the Fama-MacBeth estimation. Table 2.8 presents the estimated
prices of risk and their corresponding t-statistics for the market, unexpected default,
and conditional default variable. The test assets used to obtain results reported in
Column 1 are 10 momentum portfolios from the speculative grade group, 10 size,
and 10 book-to-market portfolios. Similarly, the test assets used for Column 2 (3)
are 10 momentum portfolios from the middle (investment) grade group, 10 size, and
10 book-to-market portfolios.
Table 2.8
Conditional Default Premium by Credit Risk Groups.
This table presents estimated monthly premiums based on the Fama-MacBeth regressions for speculative grade,
middle grade and investment grade stocks (SG, MG, IG, respectively). MKTRF is the excess return on the market,
DEF is aggregate default shocks, CDEF is the conditional default factor measured by the product of DEF and I,
where I is an indicator function which equals to 1 if the economy is in period of high default shock (above median) and
0 otherwise. The coefficients are presented in columns for each of the three credit risk groups. The Fama-MacBeth
t-statistics, calculated based on the Shanken (1992) method, are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from
1986 to 2009.
SG MG IG
MKTRF 0.0088 0.0011 -0.0021
(1.27) (0.20) (-0.38)
DEF -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0004
(-0.57) (-0.74) (0.14)
CDEF -0.0057 -0.0029 -0.0000
(-1.83) (-1.15) (-0.01)
CONST -0.0006 0.0053 0.0087
(-0.15) (1.05) (1.80)
Adj.R2 0.65 0.37 0.35
We find the conditional default premium is negative, however, it is only significant
in the cross-section of speculative grade stocks. The magnitude and significance of
the premium are slightly lower than the ones reported previously for the whole cross-
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section of momentum portfolios. One of the possible reasons for this result is the
shorter length of the time series adopted for this test. Since credit ratings are only
available after 1986, the sample size in this case is smaller.
Overall, the results show that speculative grade losers are more sensitive to condi-
tional default than middle grade or investment grade losers. Speculative grade losers
do better in times of high default shocks than predicted by the CAPM (augmented
with unexpected default risk). Further, the conditional default factor affects specu-
lative grade winners more than middle and investment grade winners. However, the
difference in sensitivity this factor is less pronounced than the one for losers. This
finding suggests that momentum profits are driven by the short side of the strategy,
namely, the losers.
2.3.3 Shareholder Recovery and Financial Distress by Credit Risk Group
In Section 2.2 we showed that losers have higher shareholder bargaining power
and higher probability of financial distress on average. However, one could argue that
this result does not need to hold for high credit risk group that essentially drives the
profitability of momentum. Possibly, losers of investment grade and middle grade
groups may have much higher shareholder recovery and, therefore, drive the observed
results. To address this we extend our previous analysis and estimate the bargaining
power and probability of financial distress of winners and losers in each of the three
credit risk groups separately.
Table 2.9 presents the results of this analysis. Panel A shows that speculative
grade losers have a lower Z-score and a higher probability of default than winners.
In particular, Z-scores of losers is lower by 1.17 and their probability of default is
higher by 28.32% (both of them statistically different from zero). Similar results
hold for middle and investment grade stocks (Panels B and C). While the difference
between winners and losers in terms of Z-scores and probability of default decreases
as we move from speculative to investment grade portfolios, it remains statistically
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significant across all three groups. According to our previous results momentum is
driven by the difference in exposure to the conditional default factor between losers
and winners. Thus, investment grade stocks do not produce positive momentum
profits, because of the smaller difference in probability of financial distress between
winners and losers for this credit risk group.
Table 2.9
The Probability of Financial Distress by Credit Risk Group.
This table documents the financial distress of portfolios comprised of winners (W) and losers (L) for each of the three
credit risk categories. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The average probability of financial
distress of winners and losers is measured by a modified Z-score and the probability of default is based on the Merton
(1974) model. The sample period is from 1985 to 2009. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, present the measures of
financial distress of winers and losers for speculative grade, middle grade and investment grade stocks, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series t-statistics for the average monthly measures of distress.
W L W - L
Panel A. Speculative grade stocks
Z-score 1.35 0.18 1.17
(16.05)
Probability of Default 3.74% 32.06% -28.32%
(-42.79)
Panel B. Middle grade stocks
Z-score 1.98 1.43 0.55
(14.74)
Probability of Default 0.74% 15.38% -14.64%
(-17.12)
Panel C. Investment grade stocks
Z-score 2.22 1.82 0.40
(10.02)
Probability of Default 0.49% 9.51% -9.02%
(-13.37)
Table 2.10 reports the estimates of tangibility, the Herfindahl index, and the R&D
ratio for speculative, middle grade and investment grade stocks. As before, these are
three separate measures of shareholder recovery. The table shows that losers have
higher recovery than winners across all credit risk categories. For example, the
tangibility of winners is higher than the tangibility of losers by 0.029 for speculative
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grade stocks. Also, within the same credit risk category, the Herfindahl index the
R&D ratio of losers is significantly higher than that for winners. We observe similar
results for the other two credit risk groups as well. Note, that the difference in the
R&D ratio between winners and losers becomes insignificant for investment grade
stocks.
Table 2.10
Shareholder Bargaining Power by Credit Risk Group.
This table reports the shareholder bargaining power of the portfolios of losers (L) and winners (W) for each of
the three credit risk categories. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The average shareholder
bargaining power of winners and losers is estimated using the tangibility measure (reflects the expected liquidation
value of the firm) and the Herfindahl index based on sales (represents the specificity of the assets) within a 2-digit
SIC code industry, and the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. The sample period is from 1985 to 2009. Panel A,
Panel B and Panel C, present the shareholder bargaining power of winners and losers for speculative grade, middle
grade and investment grade firms, respectively. The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series t-statistics
for the average monthly measures of shareholder bargaining power.
W L W - L
Panel A. Speculative grade stocks
Tangibility 0.494 0.465 0.029
(5.71)
Herfindahl index 6.80% 7.29% -0.51%
(-3.57)
R&D ratio 4.44% 4.97% -0.57%
(-3.82)
Panel B. Mid grade stocks
Tangibility 0.470 0.450 0.020
(5.07)
Herfindahl index 6.47% 6.75% -0.28%
(-2.66)
R&D ratio 3.58% 3.87% 0.29%
(3.67)
Panel C. Investment grade stocks
Tangibility 0.475 0.453 0.022
(5.31)
Herfindahl index 5.39% 5.64% -0.25%
(-2.76)
R&D ratio 3.66% 3.76% -0.10%
(-1.54)
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In summary, our results show that losers tend to have higher shareholder recovery
and probability of financial distress across all credit risk groups. Thus, it is possible
the shareholders of losers face lower risk in high default states of nature because of
higher bargaining power. Note that the shareholders of investment grade losers do
not necessarily face lower risk due to the fact that the conditional default factor is
not priced for this credit risk category and, therefore, recovery is not likely to affect
these stocks.
In this section we obtain results based on the sample of firms which are credit
rated by S&P.10 Since these firms are a subset of our total sample, consistency of
this results with our hypotheses enhance confidence in our larger sample results.
Furthermore, these results allow us to extend the findings of Avramov, Chordia,
Jostova, and Philipov (2011) - momentum exists in high credit risk firms but only in
high default states of nature.
2.4 Time-series Evolution of Conditional Default Loadings, Shareholder Recovery,
and Financial Distress
2.4.1 Time-series Dynamics of Conditional Default Loadings
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) document that
the returns to momentum strategies gradually decline and become negative roughly
one year after the portfolio formation period. This evidence implies that winners only
temporary outperform losers. Therefore, if momentum returns are consistent with a
risk-based explanation, the difference in expected returns between losers and winners
should steadily decline after the portfolio formation period. Thus, we conjecture
10Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) results are based on this sample as well
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that the difference in investors’ risk perception between losers and winners is only
temporary.
To estimate the evolution of conditional default loadings for every month t from
January 1960 to December 2009, we calculate average returns of losers and winners
for month t + k, where k = +1, . . . ,+12. We then estimate (2.4) for portfolios of
losers and winners across calendar months and present CDEF loadings for event
month t+ k.
Figure 2.2 shows the dynamics of the CDEF loadings for winners and losers after
the formation period. During the first holding month, we observe a high and positive
CDEF loading for the loser portfolio, however loadings consistently decline over time.
Given our earlier finding that the conditional default premium is -72 basis points,
this result suggests that ceteris paribus, the expected returns of losers consistently
increase. On the other hand, the CDEF loadings of winners are negative at the
beginning of the holding period, implying that they should perform better than what
the CAPM model predicts. Then the CDEF loadings increase with time, become
positive after the sixth month, and eventually the loadings of winners and losers
converge. It appears that the CDEF loadings spread between losers and winners is
temporary which is consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and
Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003). Furthermore, this result provides additional support
to our risk-based explanation of the momentum anomaly.
2.4.2 Time-series Dynamics of Shareholder Recovery and Financial Distress
This section examines how shareholder recovery and financial distress evolve be-
fore and after the portfolio formation period. We document thus far that the differ-
ence in the exposure to the conditional default factor for losers and winners is driven
by shareholder recovery and financial distress. Therefore, we hypothesize that the
shareholder recovery of winners (losers) decreases (increases) before the formation
period making them relatively riskier (safer) and increases (decreases) after the for-
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Fig. 2.2. CDEF Loading of Losers and Winners Over Time.
This figure presents the dynamics of the βCDEF loadings from equation (2.4) for winners and losers after the portfolio
formation period. The equally weighted portfolios of winners and losers are based on the 6-1-6 strategy. The period
of the analysis is 1960 - 2009.
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mation period making them relatively safer (riskier). That is, momentum profits
decreases as the difference in recovery decreases over time. As a result, the expected
returns of winners (losers) should become lower (higher) over time leading to reversal.
To test this hypothesis, we adapt tangibility as a proxy for shareholder recov-
ery. A firm with a low concentration of tangible assets should have higher recovery,
because the shareholders of this firm are less sensitive by bankruptcy risk, since ex-
pected liquidation value is low (high liquidation costs). As a result, creditors can
create more value by restructuring obligations of the firm. Similarly, higher tangi-
bility represents lower shareholder recovery.
Figure 2.3 presents shareholder recovery (measured by tangibility) of the losers
and winners portfolios over a 36-month post-formation period. For every month t
from January 1960 to December 2009, we calculate average tangibility of losers and
winners for month t + k, where k = −12, . . . ,+36. We then average tangibility for
t+ k across portfolio formation months.
We confirm the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) by documenting that the
returns of losers consistently increase and the returns of winners consistently decline
after the formation period. More importantly, we document that the shareholder
recovery of winners increases (tangibility decreases) after the portfolio formation
period, leading to lower risk of financial distress and to the observed decline in
winners’ performance. At the same time, the strength of the shareholders’ bargaining
power of the loser portfolio stocks decreases after the formation period leading to
lower risk and return. Finally, we sort stocks into deciles based on the most recent
tangibility and document that buying high and selling low tangibility stocks produces
nearly 60 basis points per month, which is 76% of the total momentum performance.
Moreover, Figure 2.3 documents that the duration of the tangibility spread is about
12 months which is close to the duration of momentum.
Further, we find that the probability of default (based on Merton (1974)) follows
a similar pattern. Figure 2.4 presents the dynamics of the probability of default for
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Fig. 2.3. Tangibility of Losers and Winners Over Time.
This figure presents shareholder recovery (measured by tangibility) of the losers and winners portfolios over a 36-
month post-formation period. For every month t from January 1960 to December 2009, we calculate average tangi-
bility of losers and winners for month t + k, where k = −12, . . . ,+36. We then average tangibility for t + k across
portfolio formation months.
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Fig. 2.4. Probability of Default of Losers and Winners Over Time.
This figure presents the dynamics of the probability of default for winners and losers before and after the formation
period. For every month t from January 1960 to December 2009, we calculate average probability of default (based
on the Merton (1974) model) of losers and winners for t+ k, where k = −12, . . . ,+36. We then average probability
of default for t+ k across portfolio formation months.
winners and losers before and after the formation period. Specifically, we document
that probability of default spread between losers and winners is temporary. Winners
(losers) experience a drop (increase) in the probability of default before the formation
period and an increase (decline) afterwards.
2.4.3 Tangibility Discussion
In Section 2.2.2 we document that winners have higher tangibility of than losers.
In this section we attempt to answer the question why we observe this behavior.
Also, according to Figure 2.3, tangibility of winners (losers) increases (decreases)
before and decreases (increases) after the formation period. This result is particular
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Fig. 2.5. Cash Holdings of Losers and Winners Over Time.
This figure presents the dynamics of the cash holding component (defined as the ratio of cash holdings to total
book assets) for winners and losers before and after the formation period. For every month t from January 1960 to
December 2009, we calculate average cash holdings of losers and winners for month t+ k, where k = −12, . . . ,+36.
We then average cash holdings for t+ k across portfolio formation months.
interesting, because the structure of the real assets of the firm tends to be stable
overtime. One of the possible explanations of this result is that the cash component
is the major determinant of the “tangibility effect.” Indeed, it is much easier to
change the cash holdings of the firm rather than its plant property and equipment.
First, we hypothesize that losers have lower tangibility, because they have rel-
atively lower cash holdings. Second, we propose that losers are likely to be more
cash-constrained, than winners because of poor previous equity performance. By
definition, losers have experienced a decline in price and, therefore, market value
over the previous 6 months. Thus, it is potentially more difficult for them to raise
cash, because in periods of high default shocks their bankruptcy probability increases
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and credibility decreases. On the other hand, winners should have easier time raising
cash due to their superior market performance. Therefore, short-term default shocks
are not likely to affect their credibility. In other words, current equity performance
could affect the future cash holdings of the firm.
We examine the importance of the cash component in tangibility dynamics using
the previously described procedure. Figure 2.5 presents the dynamics of the cash
component (defined as the ratio of cash holdings to total book assets) for winners
and losers before and after portfolio formation. For every month t from January
1960 to December 2009, we calculate average cash holdings of losers and winners for
month t+k, where k = −12, . . . ,+36. We then average cash holdings for t+k across
portfolio formation months.
According to our results the cash component is a major determinant of the “tan-
gibility effect.” Figure 2.5 supports our hypothesis that losers are likely to be cash-
constrained firms. Moreover, the time-series dynamics of cash holding closely follows
the dynamics of tangibility. We document a sharp decline in the cash holdings of
losers during the portfolio formation period and an increase afterwards.11
11The dynamics of other components is similar, however less pronounced.
45
T
a
b
le
2
.1
1
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
on
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
C
as
h
H
ol
d
in
g
on
L
ag
ge
d
E
q
u
it
y
R
et
u
rn
s.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
al
fi
rm
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
th
e
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
g
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
s
(d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
g
s
to
to
ta
l
b
o
ok
as
se
ts
)
on
la
gg
ed
eq
u
it
y
re
tu
rn
s
(R
E
T
t−
i)
.
W
e
m
a
tc
h
ed
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
g
s
w
it
h
m
o
n
th
ly
re
tu
rn
d
a
ta
.
T
h
e
t-
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fr
o
m
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
th
e
p
ar
en
th
es
is
b
el
ow
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
is
fr
o
m
1
9
6
0
to
2
0
0
9
.
M
O
D
E
L
(1
)
M
O
D
E
L
(2
)
M
O
D
E
L
(3
)
M
O
D
E
L
(4
)
M
O
D
E
L
(5
)
M
O
D
E
L
(6
)
M
O
D
E
L
(7
)
R
E
T
t−
4
0
.0
1
5
9
3
0
.0
1
5
3
5
(3
7
.5
3
)
(3
7
.1
2
)
R
E
T
t−
5
0
.0
1
5
7
4
0
.0
1
5
9
9
(3
7
.3
6
)
(3
7
.8
8
)
R
E
T
t−
6
0
.0
1
5
8
2
0
.0
1
7
2
9
(3
7
.9
0
)
(4
1
.2
8
)
R
E
T
t−
7
0
.0
1
5
3
6
0
.0
1
6
7
0
(3
6
.7
8
)
(3
9
.8
6
)
R
E
T
t−
8
0
.0
1
4
7
2
0
.0
1
6
0
5
(3
5
.0
2
)
(3
8
.0
7
)
R
E
T
t−
9
0
.0
1
4
9
3
0
.0
1
6
1
6
(3
5
.2
8
)
(3
8
.1
2
)
46
We then further investigate the relation between previous equity performance
and future cash holdings. Table 2.11 presents firm fixed-effect regressions of the cash
holdings of the firm on previous stock returns. Models 1 through 7 document that
lagged returns have consistently positive coefficients. In other words, historical stock
returns can affect current cash holdings. Therefore, it is likely that poorly (well)
performing firms will have lower (higher) cash holdings in the future. This result
provides additional support to the conjecture that losers are cash-constrained firms
that are likely to have a hard time raising cash in periods of high default.
2.5 Robustness Tests
2.5.1 Controlling for Other Risk Factors
Recent studies suggest that innovations in default spread are correlated with
the Fama-French factors. Petkova (2006), for example, documents that SMB is
significantly correlated with shocks to the aggregate default spread. Furthermore,
Hwang, Min, McDonald, Kim, and Kim (2010) use the credit spread as a proxy for
shareholder limited liability and show that it is related to HML and SMB. Given
these results, a potential concern is that default shocks and the Fama-French factors
may capture the same risk exposure. To address this concern, we augment our model
in (2.4) with SMB and HML. Therefore, we examine the model of the following form
Rei,t = βi+β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt+β
DEF
i ξt+β
CDEF
i Cξt+β
SMB
i SMBt+β
HML
i HMLt+i,t,
(2.10)
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where, SMB and HML stand for the size and value factors, respectively.12 To estimate
factor risk premia, we follow the procedure described in Section 2.1.3 and use 30 test
assets: 10 momentum, 10 size, and 10 book-to-market portfolios.
Panel A of Table 2.12 presents the betas from the first stage of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) estimation. We observe that in the presence of SMB and HML,
the βCDEF spread between losers and winners is still negative and significant (-
3.35 with a t-statistics of -2.49). Model 1 of Table 2.13 presents the second stage
of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation. The magnitude of the conditional
default premium declines from -72 to -45 basis points, however, the factor remains
statistically significant.
Further, Liu and Zhang (2008) link the growth rate of industrial production MP13
to momentum. Specifically, they document that this factor is priced in the cross-
section of momentum portfolio returns and winners have higher MP loadings than
losers. Moreover, the spread between the MP loadings of winners and losers combined
with the size of the MP premium explain a large portion of the realized momentum
profits. We, on the other hand, use the conditional default factor (CDEF) as the
main determinant of the cross-sectional variation of momentum portfolio returns.
Since the default premium is also used as an important macroeconomic indicator,
it can be correlated with the growth rate of industrial production. Therefore, a
potential concern is that our conditional default factor may proxy for the growth
rate of industrial production. To address this concern, we extend our analysis by
augmenting the MP factor to the model (2.4)
Rei,t = βi + β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt + β
DEF
i ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + β
MP
i MPt + i,t, (2.11)
12The SMB and HML factors are obtained from Kenneth R. French’s web site.
13It is defined as MPt = log IPt−log IPt−1. IP is the index of industrial production and is obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table 2.12
Beta Loadings Controlling for Other Risk Factors.
Panel A of this table presents the loadings for the returns of each of the 10 momentum portfolios on the market
βMKTRF , default shocks βDEF , conditional default shocks βCDEF , SMB (βSMB) and HML (βHML) factors.
Panel B presents the same analysis, but controlling for the growth rate of industrial production (βMP ). The equally-
weighted portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 momentum strategy. W and L represent the portfolios comprised of
winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The sample period is from
1960 to 2009. The t-statistics from the regressions are based on Huber-White robust standard errors.
Portfolio βMKTRF t-stat βDEF t-stat βCDEF t-stat βSMB t-stat βHML t-stat
Panel A. Factor loadings controlling for SMB and HML.
L 1.15 16.01 -3.54 -3.23 2.88 2.29 1.30 9.79 0.23 1.68
2 1.04 23.74 -1.82 -2.94 1.31 1.84 0.99 12.63 0.30 3.71
3 0.98 29.74 -1.13 -2.92 0.79 1.80 0.81 12.92 0.35 5.82
4 0.93 35.83 -0.70 -3.00 0.50 1.88 0.71 13.42 0.38 7.60
5 0.89 40.23 -0.49 -2.97 0.35 1.92 0.64 13.53 0.37 8.40
6 0.87 40.88 -0.34 -2.76 0.28 2.03 0.61 14.98 0.36 9.04
7 0.86 40.74 -0.20 -2.01 0.13 1.19 0.62 17.95 0.31 8.28
8 0.88 40.91 -0.03 -0.32 -0.06 -0.49 0.67 21.08 0.25 7.32
9 0.93 45.73 0.12 1.43 -0.28 -2.36 0.79 23.94 0.16 4.83
W 0.99 33.46 0.20 1.63 -0.47 -2.54 1.01 19.10 -0.03 -0.67
W - L -0.15 -1.84 3.73 3.20 -3.35 -2.49 -0.29 -1.93 -0.26 -1.66
Portfolio βMKTRF t-stat βDEF t-stat βCDEF t-stat βMP t-stat
Panel B. Factor loadings controlling for MP.
L 1.36 18.94 -3.86 -3.16 2.76 1.99 0.18 0.21
2 1.17 23.91 -2.05 -2.91 1.15 1.43 0.15 0.25
3 1.06 25.90 -1.31 -2.97 0.62 1.22 0.20 0.41
4 0.99 27.10 -0.85 -3.05 0.29 0.85 -0.02 -0.05
5 0.94 27.83 -0.61 -3.10 0.14 0.57 -0.04 -0.10
6 0.91 27.38 -0.46 -3.04 0.07 0.32 -0.11 -0.33
7 0.92 27.74 -0.32 -2.52 -0.06 -0.32 -0.13 -0.40
8 0.96 28.07 -0.17 -1.31 -0.22 -1.18 -0.13 -0.41
9 1.05 29.38 -0.06 -0.41 -0.40 -1.93 -0.11 -0.34
W 1.20 27.93 -0.07 -0.31 -0.48 -1.87 0.03 0.08
W - L -0.15 -2.08 3.79 3.19 -3.23 -2.37 -0.15 -0.10
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where, MPt represents the growth rate of industrial production computed as in Liu
and Zhang (2008).
Panel B of Table 2.12 presents the beta loadings of the 10 momentum portfolios in
the first stage of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Consistent with previous
results, losers (winners) have positive (negative) CDEF loadings. More importantly,
the CDEF spread between the two is statistically significant (-3.23 with t-statistics
of -2.37). Note that βMP ≈ 0.
Model 2 of Table 2.13 documents that the conditional default premium stays
negative and significant (-0.0075 with a t-statistics of -2.56) after including the MP
factor in the model. The growth rate of industrial production is no longer priced
in the cross-section of momentum portfolios. These results are robust to excluding
the market returns from the model to avoid a potential concern that MP and the
market return are correlated. Finally, in Model 3 of Table 2.13, we include both
the Fama-French and MP factors in the specification. The economic significance of
the conditional default premium is -48 basis points, and it remains significant. The
expected difference in momentum profits between high and low default states equals
the conditional default premium (-0.0048) multiplied by the spread in conditional
default betas between winners and losers (-3.36), i.e., 1.61%. As shown in Table 2.2,
the realized difference in momentum profits between high and low default states is
2.57%. Therefore, conditional default exposure for winners and losers still explains
63% of the realized momentum profits.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that shocks to default spread
contain information about the cross-section of returns which is independent of its
correlation with HML, SMB, and MP. Furthermore, it appears that the CDEF factor
has a large economic significance and captures between 62% and 89% of the difference
in momentum returns in high and low default shocks.
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Table 2.13
Conditional Default Premium Controlling for Other Risk Factors.
This table presents estimated monthly premiums based on the Fama-MacBeth regressions and using 30 portfolios
sorted on momentum, size and book-to-market. MKTRF is the excess return on the market, DEF is aggregate
default shocks, CDEF is the conditional aggregate default shocks measured by the product of DEF and I, where
I is an indicator function which equals to 1 if the economy is in period of high default shock (above median)
and 0 otherwise. SMB, HML and MP represent the size, value, and growth rate of industrial production factors,
respectively. T-statistics based on the Shanken (1992) method are reported in parentheses below. The sample period
is from 1960 to 2009.
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3)
MKTRF 0.0009 0.0014 0.0008
( 0.26) ( 0.29) ( 0.21)
DEF -0.0019 -0.0047 -0.0024
( -1.15) ( -1.79) ( -1.34)
CDEF -0.0045 -0.0075 -0.0048
(-2.56) (-2.56) (-2.67)
SMB 0.0026 0.0026
(2.00) (1.99)
HML 0.0027 0.0028
(2.20) (2.22)
MP -0.0006 -0.0002
(-0.48) (-0.15)
CONST 0.0042 0.0039 0.0043
(1.34) (0.83) (1.32)
Adj.R2 0.66 0.54 0.68
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2.5.2 Alternative Momentum Strategies
We have showed thus far that losers have higher loadings on the conditional de-
fault factor than winners using the 6-1-6 momentum strategy. This section presents
further evidence that this result is robust to alternative momentum strategies. Namely,
we show that our finding also hold for the strategy based on holding stocks for 12
months after the formation period (rather than 6, referred to as 6-1-12) and the
strategy based on the returns over the previous 12 months (rather than 6, referred to
as 12-1-6). Following our previous methodology, we skip a month after the formation
period for both of these strategies.
Panel A of Table 2.14 reports the CDEF loadings of momentum portfolios con-
trolling for the market and unconditional default shocks variables in equation (2.4).
The results presented in this panel reveal a familiar pattern. The loadings of losers
are positive (2.19 and 2.61 for the 6-1-12 and 12-1-6 strategies, respectively). How-
ever, they gradually decline and become negative as we move to winners (-0.02 and
-0.38 for the 6-1-12 and 12-1-6 strategies, respectively). Similarly to the previously
documented results, the difference in the loadings of winners and losers is significant
for both alternative strategies. Note that on average the 12-1-6 strategy produces
higher returns than 6-1-12. Then it is not surprising that the 12-1-6 momentum
strategy has a higher CDEF spread between winners and losers (-2.21 and -2.99 for
the 6-1-12 and 12-1-6 strategies, respectively). Our results suggest that the economic
and statistical significance of portfolios loadings on conditional default increases as
the profitability of the momentum strategy increases.
Panel B of Table 2.14 presents the estimates of the risk premium of the condi-
tional default factor from the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Again, to obtain consistent
estimates we use 30 test assets: 10 momentum (using 2 alternative momentum strate-
gies), 10 size, and 10 book-to-market portfolios. We find that the CDEF premium
does not change substantially (-64 and -67 basis points for the 6-1-12 and 12-1-6
strategies, respectively) depending on the set of momentum portfolios used for the
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estimation. Therefore, the conditional default factor is consistently priced for differ-
ent momentum specifications.
Table 2.14
Alternative Momentum Strategies.
Panel A of this table presents the loadings for the returns of each of the 10 momentum portfolios on the conditional
default factors for the 6-1-12 and 12-1-6 momentum strategies (βCDEF6−1−12 and β
CDEF
12−1−6, respectively) from the following
model - Rei,t = βi + β
MKTRF
i MKTRFt + β
DEF
i ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + i,t. W and L represent the portfolios comprised
of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). The sample period is
from 1960 to 2009. The t-statistics from the regressions are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. Panel
B presents estimated monthly premiums of the conditional default factor (CDEF ) based on the Fama-MacBeth
procedure and using 30 portfolios sorted on momentum, size and book-to-market. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics
calculated from the Shanken (1992) method.
Portfolio βCDEF6−1−12 t-stat β
CDEF
12−1−6 t-stat
Panel A. Conditional default loadings
L 2.19 2.09 2.61 2.21
2 0.87 1.46 0.99 1.55
3 0.41 1.03 0.47 1.11
4 0.20 0.67 0.24 0.77
5 0.11 0.47 0.11 0.44
6 0.08 0.39 0.02 0.10
7 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.12
8 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.36
9 -0.02 -0.07 -0.23 -0.78
W -0.02 -0.05 -0.38 -0.98
W - L -2.21 -2.86 -2.99 2.93
Panel B. Conditional default premium
CDEF -0.0064 -2.61 -0.0067 -2.67
2.6 Concluding Remarks
There are two main findings in this paper. First, we show that momentum prof-
itability is concentrated in periods of high default shocks. Specifically, losers have low
expected returns in states of high aggregate default. Since high default shocks occur
both in expansions and recessions, it is not the general state of economic conditions
that drives momentum profitability. This result is in contrast with previous studies
that document that momentum profits are more pronounced during expansions. In
addition, this finding is in line with previously documented results that momentum
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exists only among high credit risk stocks. Since high credit risk stocks are more
sensitive to high default states of nature, the time-series and cross-sectional results
on the relation between momentum and default are in line with each other.
Then we use a cross-section of momentum portfolios to test an empirical asset
pricing model that contains the market return and a conditional default shock factor.
The conditional default factor is negatively priced and has high economic significance.
Furthermore, losers have a positive conditional default loading, while winners have a
negative conditional default loading. These results suggest that losers (winners) per-
form better (worse) than the CAPM predicts during periods of high default shocks.
The combined effect of a negative conditional default premium and exposure to this
risk explains a large portion of momentum profits.
Second, we examine why the risk exposures of winners on the conditional default
factor differ from those of losers. We do this by relying on a model by Garlappi
and Yan (2011) that links the default characteristics of a firm to its shareholders’
bargaining power in bankruptcy negotiations. Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that
shareholders with a better (worse) ability to recover a part of the residual firm value
face relatively lower (higher) risk as the probability of default increases. As a result,
firms with high shareholder recovery potential should have lower expected returns
than firms with low recovery, however, this relation should be most pronounced in
high default states. We show that losers are indeed stocks with high shareholder
recovery potential. Therefore, they require relatively lower returns during periods of
high default shocks. As noted earlier, the low expected return of losers in times of
high default drives the profitability of the momentum strategy in those times.
The results have immediate implications for the previously suggested relation
between default risk and expected returns (Vassalou and Xing (2004), Chava and
Purnanandam (2010) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)). We argue that
shareholder recovery affects expected returns through aggregate default shocks. More
importantly, these shocks are better suited for capturing default risks because they
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are more difficult to predict by investors (by construction these shocks are unex-
pected). Therefore, investors are more likely to adjust their expectations to reflect
current economic conditions.
Overall we interpret our results as suggesting that momentum profits have an
important component related to default risk. These results are important in light of
previous studies that have been unable to document a relation between risk measures
and momentum returns. Such studies include Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Fama
and French (1996), Grundy and Martin (2001), Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003), and
Moskowitz (2003), among others. Our results suggest that behavioral arguments
are not necessary to explain momentum. Momentum profits are consistent with a
risk-based explanation.
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3. SOURCES OF MOMENTUM IN BONDS
In this section, we study the relation between momentum in bond returns and
aggregate default risk. We find that positive momentum profits in the corporate
bond market is primarily documented during worsening aggregate default conditions
(high default shocks), and the observed momentum profits are primarily driven by
losers. Because bankruptcy concerns increase at the firm-level during periods of high
default shocks, this is reminiscent of a conditional factor model that depends on
aggregate default risks. Indeed, we find that a conditional default factor is priced,
accounting for a large amount of the cross-sectional variation in corporate bond
portfolios. To explain this, we develop a simple theoretical model of “default-risky”
bonds with a no-arbitrage condition and show that the seemingly puzzling behav-
ior of bond momentum can be explained in a rational expectation framework. We
predict that expected bond returns will depend on default risk and the ability of
bondholders to recover firm value in default, and provide empirical support for this
proposition. Winners (losers) have relatively lower (higher) recovery potential and
therefore, become riskier (less risky) in high default states of the world. This leads
to the documented conditional momentum profits. Because our prediction is based
on “default-risky” bonds, we would only expect to find these results for bonds with
nonzero default risk. Consistent with our expectations, we find that U.S. government
bonds feature no momentum, while sovereign bonds exhibit positive momentum.
Following a standard momentum methodology (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)),
we create momentum portfolios based on corporate bond returns. Consistent with
much of the previous literature (Khang and King (2004), Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and
Swaminathan (2005b)), we do not find statistically significant momentum in the
corporate bond market in general. However, in their recent work Jostova, Nikolova,
Philipov, and Stahel (2011) report that the momentum effect exists in corporate
bond returns. They find that, similar to equity momentum (Avramov, Chordia,
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Jostova, and Philipov (2011)), bond momentum is primarily driven by firms with low
credit ratings (speculative grade bonds). Further, Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova
(2011) show that equity momentum is strongly related to aggregate default. After
controlling for unexpected default shocks, we discover that momentum does in fact
exist for bond returns, but only when high default shocks occur. We also confirm
the finding of Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) that the momentum
anomaly is primarily found in corporate bonds with high credit risk. This suggests
that the impact of aggregate default on bond momentum is conditional on the state
of the economy.
Indeed, our tests indicate that the response of corporate bond prices to default
shocks varies over time in a systematic way. Specifically, to explain the performance
of the momentum portfolios of corporate bonds, we augment the model that typically
incorporates the market and term-structure premia with default and conditional
default factors (conditional on being a high default shock state). According to our
results, the conditional default loadings of bond winners (losers) is positive (negative)
implying that they should have relatively higher (lower) risk and expected returns.
Moreover, the conditional default factor is priced in the cross-section of momentum
bond portfolios and can explain a large portion of the “anomalous” performance.
Motivated by these findings and the results from a companion paper of this work
examining stock return momentum (Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova (2011)), we
theoretically explain bond momentum based on bondholder recovery using a simple
model of risky debt valuation with a no-arbitrage restriction. The model predicts
that bondholders’ ability to recover value in default should become more important
than the default premium during periods of high default shocks. In addition, the
model predicts that if winners (losers) are on average less (more) risky, but have lower
(higher) recovery value for bondholders. Therefore, momentum profits will prevail in
periods of high aggregate default risk, and become ambiguous in low default periods.
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Thus, this simple model provides an explanation for bond return momentum in a
rational expectation framework.
A key assumption for our theoretical explanation of bond momentum is a negative
relationship between expected bond returns and bondholder recovery. To verify this
link empirically, we follow Garlappi and Yan (2011) and proxy for recovery using es-
timates of the tangibility, the specificity of the assets held by the bond issuing firms,
and R&D expenditures. Garlappi and Yan (2011) find that shareholders have differ-
ing ability to recover residual value from the firm should the firm default on its debt
obligations depending on firm characteristics, such as the tangibility and specificity
of the particular firm’s assets. We argue that, because recovery of value through
liquidation in default constitutes a zero-sum game between bond and stock owners,
bondholders’ ability to recover value in default will vary by firm as well. Based on
Garlappi and Yan (2011), we introduce three measures of bondholder recovery: the
firm’s tangibility of assets, industry Herfindahl index, and ratio of R&D expendi-
tures to total assets. Tangibility is calculated as the ratio of inventory, equipment,
receivables and cash to the total book value of assets and represents the expected
liquidation value of the firm. Bondholders of low tangibility firms should expect
lower liquidation value in default, and thus lower ability to recover value through
liquidation. Therefore, the bondholders of low tangibility firms should face higher
risk during periods of high default shocks and require higher expected returns. On
the other hand, bondholders of high tangibility firms should have higher recovery
and, therefore, lower risk and returns. The second measure of bondholder recovery is
based on the industry’s Herfindahl index (the concentration of industry sales), rep-
resenting the specificity of the firm’s assets and, essentially, liquidation costs. High
(low) Herfindahl index firms should have relatively higher (lower) asset specificity
and, as a result, are more difficult (easier) to liquidate, yielding higher (lower) risk
and required returns. In either case, bondholders of low recovery firms should face
higher risk, especially in periods of high default shocks, and should require higher
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returns. Finally, as we discuss in detail later, the ratio of R&D expenditures to
(book) total assets represents product specialization and growth options. Again,
bondholders of high R&D firms will have lower potential recovery and, therefore,
should require a premium in periods of high aggregate default.
Using these measures of bondholder recovery, we show that bonds in the “loser”
portfolio have relatively higher recovery potential in general. As a result, these bonds
should have relatively lower risk in periods of high default shocks and, therefore, pro-
duce lower returns. We further document that winners tend to have lower recovery
on average and, thus, bondholders of these securities should face higher risk dur-
ing high default states of the world, leading to higher returns. This result supports
the prediction from our theoretical model that, in high default states of the world,
recoverability plays a key role in driving the observed momentum anomaly in the
corporate bond market. Moreover, we present evidence suggesting that in the corpo-
rate bond market the recovery premium primarily exists in high default states, and
the default premium is more pronounced during low default shocks. Taken together
these results provide a strong support to the prediction of the theoretical model.
Our interpretation of the results is based on the proposition that corporate bonds
face nonzero default risk, making bondholder recovery in default an important un-
derlying driver of momentum in bond returns. If this is in fact the driving force
behind observed momentum returns, we would expect no momentum in a market
where bonds have (nearly) zero default risk. Thus, we extend this study to examine
the momentum effect in the U.S. government and sovereign bond markets. According
to our proposition, the momentum effect is driven by the difference in sensitivities
between winners and losers to the conditional default factor. Using this argument,
we should not observe any momentum in securities that have little sensitivity to
default shocks. Indeed, we document that US government bonds are not sensitive to
default shocks and, as a result, there is virtually no momentum in these bonds. On
the other hand, many sovereign bonds have potential default concerns (for example,
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the Russian government defaulted on obligations in 1998) and, therefore, we expect
to observe momentum in the sovereign market. Consistent with this prediction, we
find that sovereign bonds exhibit positive momentum in times of high default and
negative momentum in times of low default. Taken together, these results help to
support our proposition that momentum is liked to aggregate default risk.
Our work contributes to a large literature on momentum returns and a growing
literature focusing on momentum in bond markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
first discover that momentum strategies produce positive returns that commonly ac-
cepted asset-pricing models cannot explain. The majority of subsequent studies of
momentum returns focus on equity momentum, but a number of recent works exam-
ine momentum in other markets. Khang and King (2004) analyze bond momentum,
but do not find statistically significant momentum in the corporate bond market in
general. Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005b) reconfirm that momentum
in corporate bonds is insignificant; however, the authors find that equity momentum
spills over to the bond market. In other words, bonds of equity winners continue to
do well, and bonds of equity losers tend to underperform. However, the evidence of
momentum in bond returns is mixed. Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011)
observe momentum in bonds, and find that this anomaly is more pronounced after
1994. And, despite a litany of empirical evidence, commonly accepted asset-pricing
models generally fail to explain the momentum puzzle.14
We provide a number of contributions to the momentum literature. First, this
paper adds to the newly developing literature on bond momentum, which has shown
rather mixed results regarding the existence of momentum in bond returns. We re-
port evidence suggesting that, in the time-series, momentum in corporate bonds ex-
14Fama and French (1996) show that the market, SMB and HML factors cannot capture momentum
profitability. Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003), testing the theoretical model of Chen, Roll, and Ross
(1986), incorporates innovations in macro-economic variables and shows this also cannot explain
momentum.
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ists and depends on the state of economy-wide default shocks. This result allows us to
reconcile the mixed findings from the existing empirical literature (Gebhardt, Hvid-
kjaer, and Swaminathan (2005b), Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011)).
Second, we show that bond momentum can be explained by a conditional default
factor. Third, in the cross-section, we find that corporate bond losers have relatively
lower bondholder recovery than winners and, thus, have lower risk and returns dur-
ing high default shocks. Finally, we extend the analysis to the US government and
sovereign bond markets. Consistent with our risk-based explanation, we find that
momentum is observed in sovereign bonds, which are more likely to have default
concerns, but not in US government bonds. Together, this evidence provides sup-
port for a risk-based explanation for momentum returns, driven by the risk faced by
bondholders in default. To best of our knowledge no other work has provided a risk-
based explanation to this puzzle consistent with rational expectations, empirically
or theoretically.
3.1 Corporate Bonds Momentum and Aggregate Default Shocks
3.1.1 Data and Portfolio Construction
We begin by obtaining bond returns, the number of bonds in the issue, and
prices from DataStream. We include all US corporate bonds that are traded in the
US market and have all necessary information available in DataStream. Because of
thin coverage of the bond market in the early 1990s, we restrict the sample period
to begin in January of 1995 and include all data through December of 2010. To
estimate measures of bondholder recovery, we also include firm financial data from
Compustat.
We exclude from the sample all convertible bonds and asset-backed securities.
The sample contains information from 5123 individual corporate bonds. To correct
for potential data errors and to make sure that the results are not driven by outliers,
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we follow Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) and exclude all observa-
tions with returns above 50% per month. In addition, to ensure that the results
are not driven by small and non-liquid bonds, we exclude securities with market
capitalizations that would place them below 5th percentile of the total bond market
capitalization. We then follow Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005a) and
estimate corporate bond returns using the following approach.
ri,t =
(Pi,t + ACi,t + Ci,t)− (Pi,t−1 + ACi,t−1)
Pi,t−1 + ACi,t−1
, (3.1)
where, ri,t is return on bond i at time t; Pi,t is the price of the bond; AC is the
accrued interest at the end of the month t; and C represents any coupon payments
that have been made between t and t− 1.
To create bond momentum portfolios, we follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
and sort bonds into deciles based on the cumulative performance over the formation
period (t− 7 to t− 1). The bonds are equally-weighted within each decile. The top
decile is comprised of recent winners and the bottom decile contains recent losers.
We skip a month after the formation periods to avoid short-term reversals. The
momentum strategy assumes buying recent winners and selling recent losers. The
portfolios are rebalanced every month and then held for 6 months (we refer to this
strategy as 6-1-6).
Table 3.1 presents simple summary statistics for the portfolios from January 1995
to December 2010. The first impression from the data is that the bond momentum
strategy does not appear to be profitable in our sample on average (the return to
the bond momentum strategy is 17 basis points per month and not statistically
significant). We also find that the distributions of the bond momentum portfolios do
not differ substantially. The standard deviation of losers appears to be only slightly
higher than winners (2.80% vs. 1.71%, respectively). This provides little evidence of
momentum in the bond market on average.
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics of Bond Momentum.
This table presents descriptive statistics for equally-weighted momentum portfolios over the period from 1995 to
2010. The bond momentum portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 strategy. Portfolios L and W are comprised of loser and
winner bonds, respectively. Basic descriptive statistics, such as mean, median, standard deviation and percentiles
are presented in the subsequent columns.
Portfolios Mean Std. 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
L 0.79% 2.80% -2.72% -0.27% 0.77% 1.76% 4.89%
Portfolio 2 0.71% 2.00% -2.18% -0.31% 0.76% 1.68% 3.74%
Portfolio 3 0.69% 1.96% -2.38% -0.42% 0.72% 1.80% 3.54%
Portfolio 4 0.67% 1.94% -2.48% -0.36% 0.81% 1.74% 3.51%
Portfolio 5 0.69% 1.84% -2.19% -0.39% 0.84% 1.74% 3.51%
Portfolio 6 0.68% 1.84% -2.17% -0.46% 0.80% 1.80% 3.34%
Portfolio 7 0.64% 1.82% -2.34% -0.52% 0.76% 1.79% 3.08%
Portfolio 8 0.67% 1.86% -2.34% -0.43% 0.84% 1.76% 3.37%
Portfolio 9 0.72% 1.74% -2.41% -0.27% 0.89% 1.82% 3.15%
W 0.96% 1.71% -2.06% -0.03% 0.99% 2.01% 3.61%
W - L 0.17% 2.12% -2.42% -0.46% 0.26% 1.06% 3.05%
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3.1.2 Bond Momentum Conditional on Shocks to Default
The existing empirical evidence of bond momentum is mixed. Khang and King
(2004) do not find statistically significant momentum in corporate bonds returns.
Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005b) report that past winners tend to
underperform past losers in the corporate bond market, but also find that equity
momentum spills over to bonds, suggesting that corporate bond momentum may be
security specific. On the other hand, Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011)
show that the momentum anomaly exists among corporate bonds. They argue that
there is a link between bond momentum and credit risk by documenting that this
anomaly is more pronounced among speculative grade bonds (low credit ratings).
We attempt to reconcile these seemingly contradictory results by exploring the
profitability of the momentum strategy in bonds conditional on shocks to aggregate
economy-wide default. Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova (2011) present evidence
suggesting that equity momentum is sensitive to default shocks. Motivated by their
results, as well as the previous literature, we conjecture that the bond momentum
premium exists in a state dependent fashion.
To better understand the behavior of the corporate bond momentum premium
in the time-series, we compose a measure that captures unexpected changes in ag-
gregate default. We use unexpected default because it is potentially better suited
for describing default risk exposure, as it is less likely to be predicted by the market.
Following Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova (2011), we first define the aggregate de-
fault premium as the yield spread between Moody’s CCC corporate bond index and
the 10-year Treasury bond. Default shocks are then estimated as the residual of the
following AR(2) model:
DEFt = α0 + α1DEFt−1 + α2DEFt−2 + ξt, (3.2)
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where, DEFt is the default premium at month t. Aggregate default shocks are
captured by ξt. An increase (decrease) in the residuals corresponds to higher (lower)
shocks to aggregate default.15 However, this approach employs the data that is not
available during the period being analyzed. To avoid the potential look-ahead bias
we estimate model (3.2) using a recursive cumulative procedure.16 Specifically, we
estimate the model using the pre-sample period (from January of 1954 to December of
1959). We then add one observation to the sample and re-estimate the model using
the updated time-series. We repeat this procedure (keep adding one observation)
until we obtain the estimates for every observation in the sample. Therefore, the
residual at any time t is conditional on the data from January 1954 to t− 1.
An alternative interpretation of ξt is that the minus default shock (−ξt) can
be viewed as an approximated holding period return of a long CCC and a short
Treasury bond portfolio, provided that DEFt is persistent.
17 This facilitates a risk-
based explanation of our empirical results.
We now document momentum in corporate bond returns conditional on default
shocks. Based on the current momentum literature, we hypothesize that corporate
bond momentum is likely to be observed during periods of high default shocks. Table
3.2 presents the performance of bond momentum conditional on high and low default
states of the world. Panel A documents the returns of winners and losers for the
entire sample period (1995-2010). Panels B and C, presents the results of the earlier
(1995-2002) and later (2003-2010) periods.
15In this paper we use the median of the distribution to split the sample.
16The results based on the unadjusted shocks are similar and available upon request.
17Specifically, the following approximation holds if n is sufficiently larger than 1: DEFt−DEFt−1 ≈
− 1n (RCCCt − RTrt ), where Rt = − lnPt/n, and Pt is the price of this asset and n is the remaining
maturity. In addition, the sum of estimated α1 and α2 is indeed close to 1, confirming the persistence
of DEFt. Then −ξt ≈ 1n (RCCCt −RTrt ).
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Table 3.2
Bond Momentum Portfolio Returns Conditional on Default Shocks.
This table documents returns on the bond portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure conditional on aggregate
default shocks (residuals from (3.2)) over the period from 1995 to 2010.The returns to the momentum strategy (6-
1-6) based on equally-weighted portfolios are presented in the columns with t-statistics in parentheses. W and L
represent portfolios of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). Panel
A presents results from the whole sample. Panel B and Panel C present analysis of earlier (1995-2002) and later
(2003-2010) periods.
W L W - L
Panel A. Total sample
High Default 0.80% 0.19% 0.61%
( 4.56) (0.71) (3.35)
Low Default 1.19% 1.45% -0.26%
( 6.99) (4.99) (-1.05)
Total 0.98% 0.79% 0.19%
( 8.01) ( 3.90) ( 1.28)
Panel B. Period from 1995 to 2002
High Default 0.96% 0.54% 0.42%
( 4.25) (2.24) (2.79)
Low Default 0.75% 1.13% -0.38%
( 2.73) (3.37) (-1.79)
Total 0.87% 0.84% 0.02%
( 4.98) ( 3.97) ( 0.18)
Panel C. Period from 2003 to 2010
High Default 0.62% -0.21% 0.84%
( 2.25) (-0.34) (2.51)
Low Default 1.57% 1.61% -0.04%
( 7.85) (3.65) (-0.28)
Total 1.11% 0.74% 0.37%
( 6.34) ( 2.13) ( 1.33)
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Consistent with the results of Khang and King (2004), we do not find a significant
difference between the performance of losers and winners in corporate bonds in the
sample. In particular, Panel A shows that the momentum strategy (W - L) produces
19 basis points (not statistically different from zero). However, after conditioning
on high and low default states of the world, we observe positive momentum returns
during high default shocks (61 basis point with a t-statistic of 3.35), and almost
identical performance of losers and winners in low default states. The difference
is -26 basis points with a t-statistic of -1.25. Thus, it appears that momentum
does occur in bond returns, but is state-dependent. This finding extends the result
of Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) by showing that corporate bond
momentum is related to both firm-level and aggregate-level default.
However, one might argue that this result is primarily observed in early periods
of the sample when temporary mispricing is more likely to occur. Moreover, if bond
momentum is driven by mispricing or market inefficiency, it should decline over time.
Therefore, we also test whether positive momentum profits in high default states de-
cline over time. For this test, we split the sample into two subperiods: 1995-2002
and 2003-2010. As shown in Panels B and C of Table 3.2, the performance of mo-
mentum increases during the latter period (42 and 84 basis points for the 1995-2002
and 2003-2010 periods, respectively). While the magnitude of the momentum effect
in the later part of our sample appears larger, we find that the difference between the
two subsamples is not statistically significant. Hence, this result suggests that mo-
mentum is directly affected by aggregate default conditions rather than temporary
mispricing.
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Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Stivers and Sun (2010) argue that equity
momentum is likely to be observed during “good times”18 We further investigate the
relation between the profitability of bond momentum and general economic condi-
tions by presenting a double sorting procedure on both business cycles and aggregate
default shocks. Figure 3.1 presents the results of this analysis. We document that
the majority of the momentum performance is documented under very specific cir-
cumstances, namely, at the intersection of recessions and high default shocks. The
total performance of momentum during these periods is 1.77% per month. Note
that momentum is also positive in periods of high default shocks (49% per month).
Finally, during periods of expansions and low default states, there is virtually no dif-
ference between the returns of winners and losers. This suggests that the momentum
premium is strongly correlated with aggregate default shocks in the time-series.
To summarize, we document that the overall profitability of momentum in cor-
porate bonds is essentially zero (based on the Data Stream sample). However, after
conditioning on high states of default, we observe that momentum is positive and
significant during these periods and zero otherwise. This finding suggests that the
state-dependent nature of the corporate bond risk premium may generate the seem-
ingly contradictory evidence about the existence of momentum in corporate bonds.
This also suggests that the conditional aggregate default risk should be priced, and
that the returns of winners and losers will have different sensitivities to this condi-
tional risk factor. We verify these in the following sections.
18Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) define the periods of expansions (as defined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research) as “good times”. Stivers and Sun (2010) suggest that low cross-
sectional dispersion in recent stock returns correspond to “good times.”
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Fig. 3.1. Bond Momentum Portfolio Returns Conditional on Default
Shocks and on Business Cycles.
This figure documents returns on portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure conditional on both business
cycles and aggregate default shocks (residuals from (3.2)) over the period 1995 - 2010.
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3.1.3 Pricing the Conditional Default Risk Factor
This section presents evidence suggesting that momentum portfolios have differ-
ent exposure to unexpected default shocks in the corporate bond market. To capture
this result, we present an empirical asset pricing model that incorporates the com-
monly accepted factors of bond returns and a factor depicting unexpected default
shocks. Fama and French (1993) argue that besides the standard market, SMB, and
HML factors, the default (DEF) and term (TERM) premia should be included in the
model to capture the cross-sectional variation of bond returns. Further, Gebhardt,
Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005a) suggest that DEF and TERM are major de-
terminants of bond returns and should be examined separately. We begin with a
general model that includes the main drivers that appear in both models:
Rei,t = βi + β
MKT
i MKTt + β
TERM
i TERMt + β
DEF
i DEFt + t, (3.3)
where, Rei,t corresponds to the excess return on portfolio i; MKT, TERM
19 and DEF
stand for the market, term structure and default premiums, respectively. However,
our hypothesis is based on the assumption that the bond momentum portfolios are
sensitive to unexpected shocks to aggregate default rather than the simple default
premium. To test this proposition, we substitute shocks to default ξt (as defined in
(3.2)) into the model in place of DEF.
The majority of the current bond empirical literature focuses on unconditional
models. We argue that the momentum premium in corporate bonds is conditional
on high unexpected default risks. Therefore, we follow Mahajan, Petkevich, and
19Following Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005a), we estimate TERM as the difference in
the thirty-year government bond returns (from the DataStream database) and one month treasury
bill returns (from CRSP).
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Petkova (2011) and introduce a conditional default factor that allows the default
betas to be time-dependent.
Cξt = Itξt, (3.4)
where, ξt represents the shock to aggregate default in month t as defined in (3.2).
20 It
is an indicator that takes a value of 1 during high default shocks and 0 otherwise. As
a result, the conditional default factor (Cξt) captures the additional default exposure
when the economy is in a high default state. Hence, the model can be written as:
Rei,t = βi + β
MKT
i MKTt + β
TERM
i TERMt + β
DEF
i ξt + β
CDEF
i Cξt + t. (3.5)
Specifically, we are interested in the default βDEFi and conditional default β
CDEF
i
factors. While βDEFi measures the sensitivity of momentum portfolios to default
shocks, βCDEFi estimates the additional effect of default shocks during high default
states. As a result, the total effect of high default shocks is captured by the sum of
two coefficients (βDEFi + β
CDEF
i ). In addition, as discussed in the previous section,
−ξt can be regarded as the risk premium related to aggregate default. Thus, −βDEFi
and −βCDEFi will be comparable to conventional betas in linear factor models of
asset prices.
Since the loadings in the model (3.5) are not directly observable, we estimate these
for every asset separately in the time-series using the entire sample. Rolling window
estimators are not appropriate in this case, because the time-variability of default
betas should be efficiently captured by the conditional default factor. We follow a
standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to estimate the risk premiums for
each of the factors. To control for the errors-in-variables problem, we apply the
correction for standard errors proposed by Shanken (1992).
20Note that shocks are estimated using a cumulative recursive procedure described in section 3.1.2.
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The beta loadings of (3.5) are presented in Table 3.3. We find that the differ-
ence in the market loadings (βMKT ) of winner and loser portfolios is negative and
statistically significant. This implies that corporate bond losers are more sensitive
and riskier, which makes the reversal anomaly, rather than the momentum anomaly,
a more likely result. Consistent with Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2011), we ob-
serve a positive βTERMi ; however, the spread in term loadings of losers and winners is
not significant. Thus, we can infer that both the stock and Treasury market factors
matter in explaining corporate bond returns, yet cross-sectional variations from the
momentum strategies are not well accounted for by these conventional factors. We
now turn to the default factors. As discussed earlier, to interpret the default betas
in a consistent manner with the market betas, we report −βDEFi and −βCDEFi . We
show that losers are riskier (−βDEFL is 1.07) than winners (−βDEFW is 0.34) on average,
but losers are safer (−βCDEFL is -0.33) than winners (−βDEFW is 0.28) in high default
states of the world. The total effect of default risks on losers is 0.74 (1.07 − 0.33),
while the total effect for winner is 0.62 (0.34 + 0.28). More importantly, the spread
of conditional default loadings between losers and winners is 61 basis points with a
t-statistic of 2.13.
Taken together, these results suggest that corporate bond losers are on average
riskier, as suggested by the market and unconditional default betas, yet become
relatively safer than winners in high default states of world and, as a result, have
lower expected returns. Further, whether bond momentum prevails is a quantitative
concern, depending on which effect dominates. Our findings allow us to reconcile the
mixed results on corporate bond momentum. Because default shocks generate the
opposite directions of risk exposures between losers and winners, the overall effect
can be ambiguous.
To estimate factor premiums in the cross-section, we follow the Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) procedure and use 30 momentum-based portfolios in equation (3.5).
Table 3.4 reports the time-series means of these premiums. Even though the MKT
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Table 3.3
Factor Loadings Estimates.
This table presents the time-series estimates the loadings for the returns of each of the 10 bond momentum portfolios
on the market βMKTRF , term structure βTERM , default risks −βDEF and conditional default risks −βCDEF . W
and L represent the portfolios of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W
- L). The equally-weighted portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 strategy. The sample period is from 1995 to 2010. The
t-statistics from the regressions are based on Huber-White standard errors.
Portfolio βMKTRF t-stat βTERM t-stat −βDEF t-stat −βCDEF t-stat
L 0.23 3.69 0.29 5.30 1.07 2.73 -0.33 -1.88
2 0.12 2.31 0.40 8.02 0.64 2.47 -0.29 -1.74
3 0.09 2.34 0.46 10.01 0.48 1.46 -0.16 -0.92
4 0.08 1.92 0.47 9.58 0.44 1.63 -0.06 -0.27
5 0.06 1.83 0.47 10.11 0.37 1.17 0.00 0.01
6 0.05 1.62 0.46 8.57 0.30 1.43 0.11 0.68
7 0.05 1.49 0.45 8.42 0.28 1.13 0.18 1.25
8 0.04 1.23 0.45 8.11 0.28 1.22 0.21 1.68
9 0.03 1.04 0.41 7.96 0.27 1.23 0.26 1.69
W 0.06 2.04 0.33 7.13 0.34 1.36 0.28 1.89
W - L -0.17 -3.81 0.04 0.91 -0.73 -1.64 0.61 2.13
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premium is positive and significant in Model (1), the adjusted R2 is low (0.29), sug-
gesting that missing factors are needed in the model. Augmenting the model with
the term and default factors improves the R2; however, only the term premium is
significant in this specification. Moreover, our previous results in Table 3.3 suggest
that the term loadings of winners and losers do not differ significantly and, therefore,
cannot explain momentum profits. Finally, in Model (4) we augment the model with
the conditional default factor. Consistent with Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova
(2011), the conditional default premium (-CDEF) is positive and significant (0.0060
with a t-statistic of 2.21).
Table 3.4
Pricing Time-varying Aggregate Default Risks in the Cross-section.
This table presents estimated monthly risk premiums based on the Fama-MacBeth proceedure and using 30 bond
momentum portfolios. MKT is the excess return on the market, TERM represents the term structure premiums
and defined as the difference in the thirty-year government bond returns and one month treasury bill returns. DEF
is aggregate default shocks estimated proxies by the residual of (3.2), CDEF is the conditional default aggregate
shocks measured by the product of DEF and I, where I is an indicator function, which equals to 1 if the economy
is in period of high default shock (above median) and 0 otherwise. T-statistics based on the Shanken (1992) method
are reported in parentheses below. The sample period is from 1995 to 2010. To be consistent with Table 3 and the
conventional return-only factor pricing model, −DEF and −CDEF are reported.
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3) MODEL (4)
MKT 0.0177 0.0048 0.0050 0.0252
(1.95) (0.49) (0.50) (1.59)
TERM -0.0142 -0.0147 -0.0100
(-2.25) (-2.41) (-1.75)
-DEF 0.0018 0.0035
(0.51) (0.79)
-CDEF 0.0060
(2.21)
CONST 0.0034 0.0094 0.0098 0.0062
(2.26) (4.07) (3.31) (1.91)
Adj.R2 0.29 0.54 0.57 0.63
One interpretation of these results is that winners do not necessarily outperform
losers. The results suggest that winners become riskier during high default states
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of the world, and, thus, are rewarded with higher returns. This result also sug-
gests that the conditional default factor can explain a large portion of momentum
profits in periods of high default shocks. In particular, the -CDEF beta spread be-
tween losers and winners (−(βCDEFW − βCDEFL ) = 0.61) multiplied by the premium
(−CDEF = 0.0060) explains approximately 36.6 basis points of momentum profits.
The difference between momentum performance in high and low default states is
87 basis points, implying that the conditional default factor explains approximately
42% of momentum profits in corporate bonds. To summarize, these results provide
additional evidence in support of a risk-based explanation of momentum. We find
that momentum profits in corporate bonds are only positive in high default states of
the world and the conditional default factor can explain a large part of these profits.
3.2 Sources of Momentum in Bonds
The empirical results thus far point to the claim that bond losers may be rel-
atively safer than bond winners in high default states of the world. One possible
explanation for this result is based on differences in potential bondholder recovery
in financial distress. This section provides a theoretical framework that incorporates
bondholder recovery into a bond pricing model to show that explanation is theoret-
ically reasonable. Following our theoretical framework, we present empirical results
using proxies for bondholder recovery that support our theoretical predictions.
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we offer a theoretical explanation for our empirical findings based
on a no-arbitrage bond pricing model. In particular, we use a reduced-form valuation
model to derive corporate bond returns. Denote the price of a zero-coupon corporate
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debt with maturity n at time t by D
(n)
t . Then, with a no-arbitrage condition, we can
write the pricing formula of D
(n)
t as
D
(n)
t = φt,t+1Et
[
Mt+1D
(n−1)
t+1
]
+ (1− φt,t+1)Et [Mt+1Xt+1] , (3.6)
where Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, (1−φt,t+1) is the risk-neutral conditional
probability of default at t+ 1 conditional on the fact that this bond has not filed for
bankruptcy before t, and Xt+1 is the recovery value if default (or an event of financial
distress) occurs. φt,t+1 is assumed to be adapted at t. We suppress the notation for
issuer for the time being. If we further assume that X is a fraction η of total firm
value (denoted as V ), say Xt = ηtVt. Then,
D
(n)
t = Et
[
Mt+1
(
φt,t+1D
(n−1)
t+1 + (1− φt,t+1)ηt+1Vt+1
)]
, (3.7)
or alternatively
1 = Et
[
Mt+1
{
φt,t+1 + (1− φt,t+1) ηt+1Vt+1
D
(n−1)
t+1
}
D
(n−1)
t+1
D
(n)
t
]
. (3.8)
Then, taking logs of both sides, we obtain
0 = logEt
[
Mt+1Πt+1
D
(n−1)
t+1
D
(n)
t
]
, (3.9)
where,
Πt+1 ≡ φt,t+1 + (1− φt,t+1) ηt+1Vt+1
D
(n−1)
t+1
. (3.10)
Thus, corporate bond returns will depend on the default-related discount factor
(3.10) as well as the conventional discount factor Mt+1. To gain more insight from
this pricing equation, define logD
(n−1)
t+1 /D
(n)
t as the holding period return (rt+1) on
this corporate bond, and approximate it as follows:
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Et(rt+1 − rft ) ≈− Covt (mt+1, rt+1)− Covt(pit+1, rt+1)
− Et (pit+1)− 1
2
V art (pit+1)− Covt (mt+1, pit+1) ,
(3.11)
where, m and pi are the logarithms of M and Π respectively. Focusing on the first two
terms related to the risk premium, we can rewrite the above return-beta relationship
(3.11) as
Et(r
i
t+1 − rft ) ≈ −Covt(mt+1, rit+1) (3.12)
− (1− φit,t+1) [Covt (log ηit+1, rit+1)+ Covt(log V it+1Dit+1 , rit+1
)]
,
where, the superscript i refers to an issuer. The equation states that the risk pre-
mium for holding a corporate bond comes from the covariations of returns with the
aggregate wealth (mt+1), and those with the default risk. The former is important in
describing the risk premium of all risky assets. However, according to our empirical
results, this term does not appear to account for the momentum profits. Thus, our
main interest centers on the latter term. The default premium for a corporate bond
consists of two terms. The first covariance is related to the recoverability of the
bond in case of the bankruptcy. A higher value of η means that this bond is safer
when the issuer declares default, hence the sign of this covariance is negative so that
the risk premium is positive. The second term for the default risk premium refers
to the covariations between bond returns and the logarithm of the ratio of the firm
value to debt. Intuitively, the firm value will become lower and closer to the value
of debt if default is more likely.21 Thus, it is natural to view that this covariance
is also negative such that the default risk premium is positive. This risk premium
21This argument implicitly assumes that D(n) is a constant fraction of the total amount of debt.
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decomposition turns out to be useful in understanding the conditional momentum
in corporate bonds.
Suppose that there are two bond issuers w (winner) and l (loser). We assume
that w has more intangible capital such as human capital and organizational skills,
while l has more tangible and recoverable capital which is easier to liquidate in case
of bankruptcy. Now, the momentum strategy yields
Et(r
w
t+1 − rlt+1) ≈ Covt
(−mt+1, rwt+1 − rlt+1)− (1− φwt,t+1)Covt(log ηwt+1, rwt+1)
+ (1− φlt,t+1)Covt(log ηlt+1, rlt+1)−
(
1− φwt,t+1
)
Covt(log
V wt+1
Dwt+1
, rwt+1)
+ (1− φlt,t+1)Covt(log
V lt+1
Dlt+1
, rlt+1).
(3.13)
Logically, if default is indeed a serious concern for both issuers, the second and the
third terms in the right hand side of (3.13) become important, because the cash
flow in the event of bankruptcy becomes a highly probable outcome.22 Given the
assumption that winners (losers) have lower (higher) recoverability in case of default,
|Covt(log ηt+1, rt+1)| is higher for the winner, because the issuer w is more sensitive
to random changes in bond recoverability especially when default is more likely. This
produces positive a risk premium from the momentum strategy as default is near.
For the covariance between log(V/D) and bond returns, since the distance to
default is short in this case, we can infer that the firm value V is approaching D
such that log V/D converges to zero. Thus, these covariances can approach a zero
22It is possible to build a model that establishes this link, but to focus on the asset pricing impli-
cations, we do not pursue this further. In a somewhat different setting, Garlappi and Yan (2011)
provide a similar theory. To make our exposition easy, assume that 1 − φ is the same between w
and l.
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value. In addition, if default shocks are highly systematic in that both winners
and losers show similar covariations, these terms can be cancelled out.23 Therefore,
in the states of high aggregate default risks, winners become riskier mainly due to
the lower recoverability for bondholders. Put differently, when default becomes a
probable event, larger weights are given to post-default cash flows in determining
the corporate bond risk premium.
In the case of low aggregate default states, the conditional default likelihood
(1 − φt,t+1), the absolute values of Covt(log ηt+1, rt+1) and Covt(log Vt+1/Dt+1, rt+1)
tend to be small, hence the bond risk premium are similar to those of default-free
bonds. Having said that, our empirical result documents that losers are riskier
on average than winners. Given that
∣∣Covt(log ηwt+1, rwt+1)∣∣ > ∣∣Covt(log ηlt+1, rlt+1)∣∣,∣∣Covt(log V lt+1/Dlt+1, rlt+1)∣∣ is greater than ∣∣Covt(log V wt+1/Dwt+1, rwt+1)∣∣ because, other-
wise, the issuer w should be unconditionally riskier contrary to the empirical finding.
This makes the sign of (3.13) in the low default states ambiguous, and the momen-
tum strategy does not generate significantly positive profits during the regime of low
aggregate default shocks due to the offsetting effects. Thus, our empirical results
are consistent with a risk-based model of asset prices, provided that winners (losers)
have low (higher) recoverability in the event of bankruptcy.
To summarize, we make several predictions from the model. First, expected
bond returns contain a recovery component. Second, there is a risk premium for
securities with low bondholder recovery in high default states, and, therefore, buying
high recovery and selling low recovery bonds should generate a positive premium.
Finally, according to our model the recovery premium should be mainly observed in
high default states, which amplifies the risk premium due to the bond recoverability.
23A related implication is that the bonds which are subject to higher default risks will show more
pronounced effects. For instance, this conditional nature of momentum should prevail more con-
spicuously among junk bonds, if the theory is true. This is indeed verified in the next section.
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This premium does not necessary exist in low default states because of the additional
covariance terms between the distance to default and bond returns. In the next
sections we empirically examine these predictions.
3.3 Bondholder Recovery, Default Risk, and Conditional Premia
Our empirical results so far indicate that winners are relatively riskier during
periods of high default shocks, while losers are riskier on average, and we derived
a theoretical framework that explains this phenomenon using the recoverability of
corporate bonds. In this section, we uncover fundamental characteristics of bond
issuing companies that can justify the difference in the expected returns of losers
and winners in periods of high default shocks.
3.3.1 Bondholder Recovery
Motivated by the predictions of our theoretical model, we attempt to confirm
empirically that the different exposure to the conditional default factor for winners
and losers is driven by bondholder recovery. We hypothesize that the ability to re-
cover value in default plays an important role in determining the risk of bonds in
high and low default states of the world. Our predictions are reminiscent of the
results of Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011), who exam-
ine the relation between bankruptcy risk and expected equity returns conditional
on shareholder recovery. Specifically, the authors show that for high shareholder
recovery firms, expected returns to equity should be low when bankruptcy risk is
high. This occurs because the shareholders of these firms will have high bargaining
power in the process of distress negotiations, reducing the risk of the firm’s equity
when default risk is high. We use this logic to argue that the same should hold in
the corporate bond market. First, it is important to note that recovery in default
should be a zero-sum game between bond and equity holders, holding constant the
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value of the firm’s assets in default. High bargaining power for shareholders stems
from a lower amount of value that bondholders would claim through liquidation, i.e.
high shareholder recovery corresponds to low bondholder recovery. To capture this
aspect we introduce three different measures of bondholder recovery based on the
firm’s tangibility, asset specificity, and potential growth options.
The tangibility measure of bondholder recovery is based on the expected liqui-
dation value of the firm. Bondholders of firms with high asset tangibility should
recover a relatively larger portion of value in cases of financial distress. Therefore,
the bondholders of high tangibility firms should face relatively lower risk in high
default states of the world, and, as a result, should require lower expected returns.
Using the same logic, the bondholders of a firm with low tangibility should recover
less and, thus, become relatively riskier during high default periods. We measure
tangibility using the proxies of recovery per dollar from the previous empirical litera-
ture. Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) argue that more general assets produce higher
liquidation value. In particular, they find that claim holders will recover 71.5 cents
on the dollar for receivables, 54.7 cents per dollar of inventory, and 53.5 cents per
dollar of property plant and equipment. Additionally, claim holders should recover
100% of cash holdings. We calculate tangibility as
Tng =
(0.715×Receivables+ 0.547× Inventory + 0.535× PPE + Cash)
TotalAssets
.
(3.14)
All else equal, the bondholders’ ability to recover value in default will be high if the
tangibility of the firm’s assets is high.
The second proxy of bondholder recovery is based on the specificity of the firm’s
assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that redeployable assets24 should have
24In the context of this paper, redeployable assets can have other alternative usage that is not
specific to a particular industry.
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higher liquidation value, because they can be successfully used for production in
other industries. This is especially important during periods of high default states of
the world, when firms are likely to experience more problems leading to asset sales
below their potential value. All else equal, assets should be more readily redeployed
when there are numerous firms in the same industry that could make use of the
assets. In other words, firms in highly concentrated industries should have a smaller
market in which to sell their assets in liquidation (more specific assets) and, hence,
should have higher liquidation costs and lower liquidation value in bankruptcy. We
measure the specificity of assets using the firm’s two-digit SIC industry Herfindahl
index based on sales. This is calculated as:
HIj,t =
Nj,t∑
i=1
s2i,t, (3.15)
where, si,t represents sales of firm i at time t as a proportion of total sales of its’
industry j. Firms with a high (low) Herfindahl index should have relatively higher
(lower) asset specificity and, therefore, should have higher (lower) liquidation costs
and lower (higher) bondholder recovery.
Finally, the last measure of bondholder recovery is measured by the ratio of
R&D expenditures to book total assets. Opler and Titman (1994) suggest that high
R&D firms should have higher product specialization. Additionally, such firms are
also more likely to have potential growth options. Thus, it will be more difficult
to liquidate these firms, leading to lower bondholder recovery and higher risk and
returns in periods of high default shocks.
Using each measure of bondholder recovery, we find that winners have relatively
lower bondholder recovery in general. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that the average
tangibility of winners is lower than the tangibility of losers (0.44 vs. 0.46 for winners
and losers respectively), and the difference is statistically significant (t-statistics of
-4.48). We also observe that losers are more likely to be found in less concentrated
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industries, suggesting that these firms have more redeployable assets and, as a result,
lower liquidation costs in default. On the other hand, winners are more likely to
belong to high concentration industries, implying more specific assets and lower
liquidation value. We find the difference in Herfindahl’s index between winners and
losers is significant (1.17% with a t-statistic of 6.56). Finally, we show that the R&D
ratio of winners is higher (3.95% vs. 3.39%, respectively). In sum, all measures
of bondholder recovery suggest that winners have lower recovery on average and,
therefore, should have higher risk and higher expected returns during periods of high
aggregate default shocks.
Table 3.5
Bondholder Recovery and the Probability of Financial Distress of
Winners and Losers.
This table documents the bondholder recovery and financial distress of losers (L) and winners (W) . Panel A presents
the average bondholder recovery of winners and losers using the tangibility measure reflecting the expected liquidation
value of the firm, the Herfindahl index based on sales (represents the specificity of the assets) based a 2-digit SIC
code industry, and the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Panel B estimates the average probability of financial
distress of winners and losers using a modified Z-score and the probability of default based on the Merton (1974)
model. The sample period is from 1995 to 2010. The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series t-statistics
for the average monthly measures financial distress and shareholder recovery.
W L W - L
Panel A. Bondholder recovery
Tangibility 0.44 0.46 -0.02
(-4.48)
Herfindahl index 8.18% 7.01% 1.17%
(6.56)
R&D ratio 3.95% 3.39% 0.56%
(3.27)
Panel B. Financial distress
Z-score 1.65 1.38 0.27
(6.35)
Probability of Default 2.65% 9.70% -7.05%
(-7.40)
Overall, our analysis suggests that winners can be characterized by lower expected
liquidation value and higher asset specificity. In either case, bondholders of winners
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should be more affected by higher liquidation costs and require higher returns. These
concerns should be especially relevant in high default states of the world when default
risk is higher and firms are “cheap.”
3.3.2 Default Risk
Our results indicate that losers are more sensitive to unexpected changes in ag-
gregate default. Thus, we can hypothesize that losers have higher risk of financial
distress on average and, thus, are more affected by unexpected increases in aggregate
default, but become less risky when the economy is in a high default risk state. The
purpose of this section is to test this proposition.
We use two measures to document the relation between momentum portfolios
and firm level default risk. The first measure is based on Bharath and Shumway
(2008).25 The authors start with the assumption that equity is valued as a European
call option on the total value of the firm. However, to calculate this measure of
firm distance to default, one needs to estimate unobservable parameters. Bharath
and Shumway (2008) argue that 1) the market value of debt can be approximated
by its face value, 2) the volatility of debt is a function of stock volatility, and 3)
the expected return is equal to the stock return from the previous period.26 Then,
“naive” distance to default can be defined as:
DDnaive =
ln[(E + F )/F ] + (ri,t−1 − 0.5σ2V )T
σV
√
T
, (3.16)
25A similar approach was introduced by Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Campbell, Hilscher, and
Szilagyi (2008).
26This is essentially an extension of the Merton (1974) model.
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where E and F stand for the market value of equity and the face value of debt,
respectively, σV is the standard deviation of the firm’s value, and T is the estimation
period. Therefore, the naive probability of default is
pinaive = N(−DDnaive). (3.17)
However, one potential concern is that this measure of default risk incorporates
historical returns, and consequently, could be related to momentum. To address
this issue, we incorporate the modified Altman Z-score as an alternative measure.
This measure of individual distress risk is based solely on financial statement data
and should not be directly related to momentum. We follow Graham, Lemmon, and
Schallheim (1998) and calculate this measure as:
Z-score =
1.2×WC + 1.4×RE + 3.3× EBIT + SALES
TA
, (3.18)
where WC, RE, EBIT , and SALES represent working capital, retained earnings,
earnings before interest and taxes, and sales, respectively. TA stands for the book
value of total assets.
Our previous findings indicate that losers have higher sensitivities to unexpected
shocks to aggregate default. We hypothesize that this is observed due to the fact
that losers have higher bankruptcy risk on average. Panel B of Table 3.5 presents
the results of this analysis. Indeed, it appears that losers have lower Z-scores than
winners (the difference is 0.27 and statistically significant with a t-statistics of 6.35).
Similarly, we find that the probability of default for losers is 7.05% higher than for
winners. This difference is statistically significant from zero (t-tatistics is 7.40).
In summary, our results suggest that losers are more sensitive to default and are
also likely to have higher bondholder recovery. Therefore, the difference in condi-
tional default betas between losers and winners is potentially driven by the difference
in bondholder recovery. More importantly, the recovery argument comes into play
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under certain conditions. Namely, it should mainly happen during periods of high
default shocks, which makes default risk conditional on high shocks.
3.3.3 Conditional Default and Recovery Premia
In this part of the paper we examine two important implications of the theoretical
framework presented in this paper. The first prediction suggests that the default
premium should be less important during high default states of the world. We argue
that in these extreme economic conditions the performance of winners and losers is
similar; therefore, the potential default premium of losers becomes less important.
Second, our model predict that recovery premium of winners should become more
important during high default shocks, leading to higher winner performance and,
therefore, momentum.
To test these predictions we sort bonds in high and low bondholder recovery
portfolios using the median values of tangibility. Similarity, we split the sample in
high and low default portfolios using credit ratings. Then we estimate the recovery
(default) premium as a difference between low and high tangibility (credit rating)
portfolios for every month of sample.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.6. According to Panel A of the
table, there is almost no difference between performance of low and high tangibility
(recovery) bonds during periods of low default shocks (-0.04% not statistically differ-
ent from zero). However, when economy experience unexpected increase in aggregate
default, low tangibility tend to outperform high tangibility bonds. The difference is
21 basis points with a t-statistics of 3.76. One of the possible explanations of this
result is that bondholders of low tangibility bonds face higher risk during periods of
high default, because of lower potential recovery in case of forced liquidation. On
the other hand, in periods of low aggregate default the “recovery effect” is less im-
portant, because of unexpectedly low likelihood of outright liquidation. Thus, there
is no difference in returns of low and high tangibility portfolios.
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Table 3.6
Conditional Recovery and Default Premia.
This table documents the bondholder recovery and financial distress premia conditional on aggregate default shocks
(residuals from (3.2)) over the period from 1995 to 2010. Panel A show conditional performance of low, high, and
low minus high (bondholder recovery premium) tangibility portfolios. Panel B documents conditional performance
of low, high, and low minus high (default premium) credit rating portfolios. The numbers in parentheses represent
simple time-series t-statistics.
High Default Shocks Low Default Shocks High - Low Shocks
Panel A. Conditional recovery premium
Low Tng 0.82% 0.71% 0.11%
(4.20) (4.81) (0.44)
High Tng 0.62% 0.75% -0.21%
(3.11) (4.09) (-0.75)
Low - High Tng 0.21% -0.04% 0.24%
(3.76) (-0.67) (3.05)
Panel B. Conditional default premium
Low Rating 0.74% 0.94% -0.20%
(3.51) (4.85) (-1.68)
High Rating 0.75% 0.57% 0.18%
(3.80) (3.02) (0.66)
Low - High Rating -0.01% 0.37% -0.38%
(-0.10) (3.14) (-2.14)
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Panel B of Table 3.6 documents the conditional default premium. We find that in
this case the performance of low and high rated bonds is essentially the same during
periods of high default shocks. The difference is -0.01% and it is not statistically
different from zero. However, in high default states of the world low rated bonds
outperform high rated bonds by 37 basis points with a t-statistics of 3.14. This
evidence provides additional support to our hypothesis that default premium is likely
to be more pronounced in low aggregate default states.
Overall, we confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Specifically, we
show that the recovery “effect” is mainly observed in periods of high default shocks
and the default premium is more pronounced during low default shocks. Therefore,
bonds winners outperform losers during high default shocks, because they have low
recovery and higher risk during these economic conditions, which leads to observed
conditional momentum in high default states.
3.4 Robustness Checks
In this section we present robustness checks. First, we confirm the previous
evidence of Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) and link bond momentum
to firm-level default. We expect that bond momentum will be primarily observed
at the intersection of high firm and aggregate level defaults. Second, taking into
account that low credit risk bonds drive momentum returns, we examine whether
the difference in the conditional default loadings between winners and losers remains
for different credit risk groups. Third, we extend our analysis to the sovereign bond
and US government bond markets. Since sovereign bonds are likely to contain a
default component and US government default risk should approach to zero (at least
in theory), we expect to find some weak evidence of momentum among sovereign
bonds and no momentum in US government bonds. Finally, we explore the wealth
transfer effect between equity and bondholders of the same firm.
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3.4.1 Bond Momentum and Conditional Default Shocks by Credit Risk Group
Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) document that momentum in
the bond market is primarily driven by high credit risk bonds. Specifically, they
show that non-investment grade bonds are more likely to be concentrated in winner
and loser portfolios, and, therefore, they argue that excluding non-investment grade
bonds from the sample leads to zero momentum profits.
Given our results thus far, we propose that high credit risk bonds (low rated)
are more sensitive to aggregate default than low credit risk (high rated). Thus,
momentum in the corporate bond market is driven by high credit risk bonds during
periods of high default. This would also help to explain why bond momentum is
difficult to observe. The majority of studies have concentrated on investment grade
bonds (Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005b)) without conditioning on
states of the world. Under our framework, we would expect that it will be difficult
to observe momentum among investment grade bonds, because they are less likely
to be affected by recovery.
To test this proposition, we estimate the performance of the momentum strategy
conditional on default shocks for subsamples with different credit risk. We follow
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2011) and assign numeric values to each
credit rating27 (1 represents AAA rating and 22 corresponds to D). We then drop high
credit risk bonds (D and lower) from the total sample and repeat our previous analysis
for this subsample. Additionally, we exclude bonds with ratings below CCC+ from
the sample and, finally, we exclude bonds rated below BBB.
The result of this approach is presented in Table 3.7. The equally-weighted
returns of the momentum strategy (based on a 6-1-6 strategy) are estimated condi-
tionally on default shocks (as defined by residuals of (3.2)). Panel A of Table 3.7
27The credit ratings of bonds are obtained from DataStream.
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presents the results for the subsample of bonds with credit ratings from AAA to C.
Consistent with our previous results, momentum in the corporate bonds market is
only significant in periods of high default shocks (41 basis points with a t-statistic
of 2.49). Furthermore, after excluding bonds with ratings below CCC+, momentum
performance declines, but remain positive and significant (27 basis points with a t-
statistics of 1.71). Finally, in Panel C, we exclude all bonds with ratings below BBB,
and the returns to the bond momentum strategy become negative for both high and
low default shock periods. First, these results support the conclusion of Jostova,
Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011) that momentum is primarily driven by high
credit risk bonds. Moreover, we extend this result by documenting a link between
momentum profits and aggregate default shocks. Note that high default shocks are
necessary for positive momentum; Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that even including
high credit risk bonds in the sample does not generate positive momentum during
periods of low default shocks.
3.4.2 CDEF Loadings by Credit Risk Group
This section continues the analysis of different credit risk groups. Jostova, Nikolova,
Philipov, and Stahel (2011) find that momentum in bonds is primarily driven by
high credit risk bonds. Therefore, we hypothesize that the spread of CDEF loadings
should disappear for the subsample of low credit risk bonds. We argue that bonds
with lower credit ratings are more sensitive to unexpected changes in aggregate de-
fault. As we discussed in Section 3.3.1, one possible explanation of the momentum
anomaly is based on bondholder recovery. However, the bondholder recovery argu-
ment is likely to be more important for high credit risk firms and in high default
states of the world. In other words, we suggest that bondholder recovery affects
performance through the aggregate and firm-level default risks.
To test this proposition, we follow the previously described methodology (Section
3.1.3). We estimate equally-weighted returns of the momentum portfolios based the
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Table 3.7
Momentum in Corporate Bonds by Credit Risk Group.
This table presents returns of momentum portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure using aggregate default
shocks (residuals from (3.2)) over the period from 1995 to 2010. The returns generated using the momentum strategy
(6-1-6) based on equally-weighted portfolios are presented in three columns. W and L represent the portfolios
comprised of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). Panel A,
Panel B and Panel C contain results obtained from sorting based on the sample based on bonds with ratings from
AAA to C, AAA to CCC+, and AAA to BBB, respectively. The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series
t-statistics for the average monthly returns.
W L W - L
Panel A. AAA to C
High Default 0.76% 0.35% 0.41%
( 4.14) (1.60) (2.49)
Low Default 0.99% 1.29% -0.30%
( 6.00) (4.64) (-1.39)
Panel B. AAA to CCC+
High Default 0.71% 0.45% 0.27%
( 3.96) (1.78) (1.70)
Low Default 0.92% 1.31% -0.39%
( 5.46) (5.34) (-1.98)
Panel C. AAA to BBB
High Default 0.78% 0.68% 0.10%
( 4.32) (3.42) (0.72)
Low Default 0.66% 1.05% -0.38%
( 3.63) (4.98) (-2.31)
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6-1-6 momentum strategy. We then estimate the CDEF loadings (βCDEF ) for every
portfolio using (3.5) using different credit risk groups. The results of this approach
are presented in Panel A of Table 3.8. First, we estimate (3.5) for the subsample
of bonds with ratings C and higher. The CDEF loadings (βCDEFAAA−C) of losers and
winners are 0.29 and -0.41, respectively. More importantly, the difference in the
CDEF loadings between losers and winners is significant (t-statistics 2.02). This
result is consistent with our previous finding that losers are relatively safer than
winners in high default states of the world. We then repeat this analysis for the
subsample of bonds with credit ratings CCC+ and higher. In this case, the CDEF
spread between winners and losers decreases and becomes insignificant (0.48 with a
t-statistics of 1.55). Finally, we exclude from the sample bonds rated below BBB,
and the spread becomes even smaller (0.39 with a t-statistics of 1.12). Further, we
continue with the estimation of the price of conditional default risk using the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) procedure and the Shanken (1992) adjustments of standard
errors. The results are consistent with our prediction that after excluding low rated
bonds from the sample, the price of conditional default risk is no longer significant.
Taken together, our results indicate that momentum in the corporate bond market
is primarily driven by high credit risk bonds during unexpected increases in aggregate
default. Specifically, after excluding bonds with high credit ratings, the momentum
returns disappear in both high and low default periods. Moreover, the difference
between the CDEF loadings between losers and winners becomes insignificant.
3.4.3 Momentum in Government and Sovereign Bonds
Our results thus far indicate that momentum exists in corporate bonds and it is
driven by bondholder recovery in high default states of the world. We assume that
default risk of the US government bonds should approach zero. Therefore, there is
should be no difference between the CDEF factor loadings of winners and losers,
and, hence, no difference in expected returns, and no momentum.
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Table 3.8
Fama-MacBeth by Credit Group.
Panel A of this table reports loadings for the returns of each of the 10 bond momentum portfolios on the conditional
default factor (CDEF measured by the product of DEF and I, where I is an indicator function which equals to
1 if the economy is in period of high default shock (above median) and 0 otherwise) by credit risk groups. The
equally-weighted portfolios momentum portfolios are based on the 6-1-6 momentum strategy. W and L represent
the portfolios comprised of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L).
The sample period is from 1995 to 2010. The conditional default loading are estimated from the following model -
Rei,t = βi+β
MKT
i MKTt+β
TERM
i TERMt+β
DEF
i ξt+β
CDEF
i Cξt+ t. β
CDEF
AAA−C , β
CDEF
AAA−CCC+, and β
CDEF
AAA−BBB
represent the CDEF loadings of the momentum portfolios based on samples with different credit risk. The t-statistics
from the regressions are based on Huber-White standard errors. Panel B presents estimated monthly premiums of
the conditional default factor based on the Fama-MacBeth procedure and using 30 portfolios sorted on momentum.
The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics calculated from the Shanken (1992) method. To be consistent with Table 3, Table 4
and the convention of return-only factor pricing models, −β’s and −CDEF are displayed.
Portfolio −βCDEFAAA−C t-stat −βCDEFAAA−CCC+ t-stat −βCDEFAAA−BBB t-stat
Panel A. CDEF loadings
L -0.41 -1.71 -0.32 -1.24 -0.33 -1.25
2 -0.31 -1.14 -0.31 -1.17 -0.31 -1.60
3 -0.21 -0.96 -0.23 -1.06 -0.19 -1.04
4 -0.06 -0.29 -0.06 -0.27 -0.13 -0.68
5 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 -0.53
6 0.07 0.35 0.08 0.37 0.05 0.22
7 0.12 0.48 0.11 0.45 0.03 0.14
8 0.20 0.82 0.15 0.65 0.04 0.20
9 0.22 1.16 0.17 0.66 0.10 0.44
W 0.29 1.63 0.17 0.72 0.06 0.27
W-L 0.69 2.02 0.48 1.55 0.39 1.12
Panel B. Price of conditional default risk
-CDEF 0.0037 1.98 0.0027 1.71 -.0008 -0.28
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On the other hand, sovereign bonds may have some default component, and, as
a result, different recovery rates. One of the most famous examples is the Russian
default of 1998. Similar events also unfolded in Argentina in late 2001. There is also
empirical evidence implying that sovereign bonds can be affected by default. For
example, Pan and Singleton (2008) use the data from Mexico, Turkey, and Korea
to document that the sovereign CDS spreads reflect default risk and it is related
to unpredictable future variation in credit-event arrival intensity. Hence, we argue
that momentum can exist in sovereign bond markets, because such bonds have some
default component by definition. However, we do not expect the momentum anomaly
to be large in magnitude, because the default component in sovereign bonds is rather
small. Finally, we do not expect to observe any momentum in US government bonds
due to insignificant default risk.
To test this proposition, we estimate the performance of the 6-1-6 momentum
strategy for US government and sovereign bonds. The data is obtained from the
DataStream database. We include all government bonds traded in the US market.
Following Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2011), we drop observations with
returns above 50% per month. The period of the sample is from 1995 to 2010.
Panel A of Table 3.9 documents the performance of the momentum strategy based
on US government bonds conditional on high and low default shocks. We observe
that aggregate default shocks do not affect the momentum based on US government
bonds based on the entire sample. While losers tend to outperform winners on
average, the difference is not significant (-12 basis points with a t-statistics of -
1.34). Further, it appears that in high default states the performance of winners and
losers increases; however, it increases at the same rate, and, as a result, there is no
significant momentum.
In Panel B of Table 3.9, we document the returns of losers and winners in sovereign
bonds traded in the US market, conditional on default shocks. First, we note that
the momentum anomaly does not exist for the full sample (-3 basis points with a
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t-statistics of -0.23). However, after conditioning on aggregate default, we docu-
ment positive (negative) momentum in periods of high (low) default states of the
world. Note that the difference in performance of losers and winners is only weakly
significant.
Table 3.9
US Government and Sovereign Bond Momentum Portfolio Returns
Conditional on Default Shocks.
This table documents returns on the bond portfolios formed based upon a sorting procedure conditional on aggregate
default shocks (residuals from (3.2)) over the period from 1995 to 2010.The returns to the momentum strategy (6-
1-6) based on equally-weighted portfolios are presented in the columns with t-statistics in parentheses. W and L
represent portfolios of winners and losers, respectively. Momentum corresponds to the hedge portfolio (W - L). Panel
A presents results using US government bonds. Panel B document documents this relation for sovereign bonds that
traded on the US market.
W L W - L
Panel A. US government bonds
High Default 0.68% 0.73% -0.05%
(2.72) (-0.44) (-0.41)
Low Default -0.36% -0.17% -0.20%
( -1.29) (2.21) (-1.48)
Total 0.18% 0.30% -0.12%
( 1.06) ( 1.58) ( -1.34)
Panel B. Sovereign bonds
High Default 0.31% 0.04% 0.27%
( 1.76) (0.11) (1.69)
Low Default -0.01% 0.37% -0.38%
(-0.06) (1.72) (-1.73)
Total 0.19% 0.22% -0.03%
( 1.08) ( 0.99) ( -0.23)
Overall, these results suggest that momentum is indeed related to the credit risk
characteristics of bonds. We show that there is no momentum in US government
bonds, consistent with the limited exposure of this type of asset to credit risk. On
the other hand, sovereign bonds likely incorporate some nonzero default risk, and as
a result we find weak evidence of momentum in this type of security.
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3.4.4 Wealth Transfers between Bonds and Equity Holders
This section presents evidence suggesting that recovery affects the performance
of bonds and equity of the same firm differently. Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova
(2011) argue that shareholders of equity losers have high bargaining power (low
tangibility) and, therefore, become relatively safer during high default states. Using
the same intuition, we propose that bond losers should have high bondholder recovery
(high tangibility), which should lead to lower expected returns during periods of high
default shocks.
First, we test the prediction of the theoretical model suggesting that recovery
effects are more pronounced during high default states of the world. The probability
of bankruptcy in these states is higher on average and, therefore, potential recovery
concerns become important. Second, we examine the wealth transfer hypothesis.
We propose that an increase in tangibility leads to higher risk and expected stock
returns because of decreasing shareholder bargaining power in periods of high default
shocks. On the other hand, we expect that bond returns decline in tangibility,
because lower tangibility is equivalent to lower bondholder recovery (given that these
are debt and equity holders of the same firms, low bondholder recovery also means
high shareholder bargaining power), leading to higher risk and expected bond returns.
In other words, during periods of high default shocks, we should observe a wealth
transfer from equity (bond) to bond (equity) holders if tangibility is low (high).
To test these propositions, we match the returns of bonds and equity for firms in
the sample. We then sort firms into quintiles based on their tangibility (as defined in
(3.14)) and estimate equally-weighted returns of bonds and equity for these portfolios.
Using (3.2), we split the sample into periods of low and high default shocks using
previously described cumulative recursive procedure and calculate the returns of the
portfolios conditional on default shocks.
Table 3.10 presents the results of this analysis. We find the evidence support-
ing the theoretical prediction that both equity and debt returns of low and high
96
tangibility portfolios do not differ significantly during periods of low default shocks.
Specifically, we show that the difference in stock returns between high and low tan-
gibility companies is -34 basis points with a t-statistic of -0.69. Similarly, we find
that tangibility does not affect the bond returns of the firms in low default states
(the difference is -3 basis points with a t-statistics of -0.31). In other words, recovery
does not affect firms’ performance if the economy experiences unexpected declines
in aggregate default.
On the other hand, during the high default states of the world, we observe that
bond returns decrease and stock returns increase as tangibility increases. In partic-
ular, Panel B of Table 3.10 shows that the bonds of low tangibility firms outperform
the bonds of high tangibility firms by 23 basis points on average. Furthermore, equity
performance of high tangibility firms is 93 basis points higher than of low tangibility
firms. The difference between performance of high and low tangibility firms is statis-
tically significant in both cases. This result supports our proposition that tangibility
drives the returns of both bonds and equity, and in the opposite direction, in periods
of high default shocks. As we already discussed in Section 3.3.1, bond losers have
higher bondholder recovery (higher tangibility) than winners. Therefore, bond losers
become safer during the periods of high default states of the world partially due to
risk shifting from bond to equity holders. Similarly, bond winners become relatively
riskier due to risk transfer from equity and bond holders.
More importantly, these results provide evidence of wealth transfers between bond
and equity holders that are concentrated in periods of high default shocks. Figure
3.2 documents that bondholders have positive returns and shareholders have nega-
tive returns for low tangibility firms (high shareholder recovery and low bondholder
recovery). Given that these are matched by company, shareholders appear to earn
lower returns while the return to bondholders increases. This implies that low ex-
pected liquidation value in periods of high default shifts risk from equity to bond
holders. It is likely that bondholders of firms with a low concentration of tangible
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Table 3.10
Tangibility and Performance of Bond and Equity Conditional on Default Shocks.
This table documents the performance of equity and bonds conditional on default shocks. To comprise the sample
we matched bonds and equity of the same firms and sorted them based on tangibility (as defined in (3.14)). Low
(high) tangibility portfolio is based on the firms with bottom (top) 20% of tangibility. High and low aggregate default
shocks are defined based on residuals from (3.2)). Panel A presents the equally-weighted equity and bond returns
of high and low tangibility firms during periods of low default shocks. Panel B present a similar analysis for high
default shocks. The sample period is from 1995 to 2010. The numbers in parentheses represent simple time-series
t-statistics.
Low Tng High Tng Low - High Tng
Panel A. Low default shocks
Bond returns 0.81% 0.84% -0.03%
(-0.31)
Equity returns 2.13% 2.47% -0.34%
(-0.69)
Panel B. High default shocks
Bond returns 0.70% 0.48% 0.23%
(2.68)
Equity returns -0.28% 0.65% -0.93%
(-1.99)
98
Fig. 3.2. Performance of Bonds and Equity Conditional on Tangi-
bility and Default Shocks.
This figure documents returns on tangibility portfolios (1 corresponds to lowest quintile and 5 represent the highest
quintile of tangibility) conditional on aggregate default shocks over the period 1995 - 2010.
assets have higher risk due to lower bondholder recovery and, therefore, claim higher
returns in periods of high default shocks. To summarize, we show that the recovery
effect is asymmetric in that it is more important in high default states of the worlds.
More importantly, we document that one of the possible reasons of momentum in
the corporate bond market is risk shifting from equity to bondholders.
3.4.5 Reversal
The previous empirical literature shows that equity losers keep outperform equity
winners for nearly one year after the formation period. For example, Jegadeesh and
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Titman (2001) document a momentum reversal after the first year.28 This evidence
implies that equity winners only temporary outperform losers. If momentum exists
in equity, it is possible that the same effect persist in the corporate bond market. To
best of our knowledge no other work analyzed long-term reversal in corporate bond
returns.
Figure 3.3 presents cumulative momentum performance over a 20-month post
formation period. First, we estimate performance every month t from January 1960
to December 2010, we calculate the difference between average returns of losers and
winners for month t + k, where k = +1, . . . ,+20. We then estimate cumulative
momentum profits starting from month 1.
According to Figure 3.3, cumulative momentum performance keeps increasing
for the first 10 months after the formation period. However, from month 11 through
19, it consistently decline and at month 20 it becomes negative. Even though, the
magnitude of the observed reversal is not high (almost 2% at the 10th month), the
pattern is similar to the equity reversal effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003).
To summarize, we find long-term reversal in the corporate bond market. However,
we have to admit that our analysis is based on the limited sample of bonds available
from the DataStream database. It is possible that extending the time-series and
including more observations in the sample can change this result.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Does momentum exist in bond markets? A recent paper by Jostova, Nikolova,
Philipov, and Stahel (2011) shows momentum in corporate bonds exists and is pri-
marily driven by high credit risk bonds. However, Khang and King (2004) and
28Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) document similar findings.
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Fig. 3.3. Long-term Reversal in Corporate Bond Returns.
This figure documents cumulative returns of the momentum portfolio 20 months after the formation period.
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Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005b) do not find significant momentum
in the bond market. We reconcile this conflicting evidence by showing that momen-
tum does exist in bond markets, but is only found in financially distressed bonds
during high default states of the world. Our results indicate that momentum in
the corporate bond market is related to aggregate default risks, and we show that
momentum returns are primarily observed in periods of high default shocks and are
essentially non-existent otherwise.
A central prediction of the paper is that bonds losers and winners have different
exposures to unexpected changes in aggregate economy-wide default shocks. Indeed,
we show that the CDEF spread between winners and losers is positive and significant.
Furthermore, it appears that the conditional default factor is priced in the cross-
section of bond momentum portfolios and has a positive premium. Taken together,
these results suggest that winners are relatively riskier than losers in periods of high
default shocks, and, therefore, the bondholders of winners face higher risk and require
higher returns during these periods.
Mahajan, Petkevich, and Petkova (2011) provide a risk-based explanation of the
momentum anomaly in the equity market by documenting that this phenomenon is
driven by shareholder recovery and financial distress. We extend this empirical anal-
ysis to the corporate bond market, and our results suggest that momentum in bonds
is driven by bondholder recovery. In addition, we offer a theoretical explanation to
our findings. Specifically, we find that winners have lower bondholder recovery than
losers, and, therefore, become relatively riskier in high default states of the world,
leading to higher expected returns, while the opposite is true for losers. Using the
same argument, we propose that bondholders of winners require a higher recovery
premium during periods of high default shocks when the risk of actual liquidation
increases across the board. On the other hand, during low default shocks recovery
become less important, because of lower threat of liquidation. Motivated by these re-
sults, we analyze the potential wealth transfer between bond and equity holders due
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to recovery. Our results support the hypothesis that bonds winners become riskier in
periods of high default, due in part to the risk transfer from equity to bondholders.
One possible direction of future research is to explore whether recovery is corre-
lated among different types of assets. Further, it would be interesting to examine
whether the conditional default factor affects the expected returns of securities in
the commodities and currencies markets.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we address two research questions. First, we study the rela-
tion between aggregate-level default and momentum. Second, we investigate whether
momentum exits in the corporate bond market.
There are two main findings in the first essay. First, we document that mo-
mentum profitability is concentrated in periods of high default shocks. Specifically,
losers have low expected returns in states of high aggregate default. Since high de-
fault shocks occur both in expansions and recessions, it is not the general state of
economic conditions that drives momentum profitability. This result is in contrast
with previous studies that document that momentum profits are more pronounced
during expansions. Second, we provide a possible risk-based explanation to this be-
havior based on shareholder bargaining power. We do this by relying on a model by
Garlappi and Yan (2011) that links the default characteristics of a firm to its share-
holders’ bargaining power in bankruptcy negotiations. According to our results,
losers are stocks with high shareholder recovery potential. Therefore, they require
relatively lower returns during periods of high default shocks. As noted earlier, the
low expected return of losers in times of high default drives the profitability of the
momentum strategy during those periods.
In the second essay we present evidence suggesting that momentum exists in
the corporate bond market. We document that momentum returns are primarily
observed in periods of high default shocks and are essentially non-existent otherwise.
Further, we show that the CDEF spread between winners and losers is positive and
significant. Furthermore, it appears that the conditional default factor is priced in
the cross-section of bond momentum portfolios and has a positive premium. Taken
together, these results suggest that winners are relatively riskier than losers in periods
of high default shocks, and, therefore, the bondholders of winners face higher risk and
require higher returns during these periods. We also provide a risk-based explanation
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to this finding using bondholder recovery. According to our findings, winners have
lower bondholder recovery than losers. Therefore, bondholders of winners require
a higher recovery premium during periods of high default shocks when the risk of
actual liquidation increases across the board. On the other hand, during low default
shocks recovery becomes less important, due to lower threat of liquidation. Finally,
we present evidence suggesting that reversals also exist in bonds.
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